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ABSTRACT
Public Private Partnership (PPP) contracts tend to have longer contract durations
compared to other conventional procurement methods. Due to their prolonged nature,
PPP contracts are extremely prone to contract renegotiation along their lifecycles in
comparison to other forms of contracts with shorter durations. The common outcomes
of the renegotiation process may include: increasing the service charges, increasing the
concession period, or paying a lump sum amount to the party of concern in order to
maintain a fixed rate of return and keep the return on equity constant. In this research,
a framework is developed in order to calculate the renegotiation process outcomes and
facilitate the decision making process of choosing the optimum scenario that preserves
the rights and the interests of all the stakeholders. This is done using a weighted sum
model to calculate the weights and ranks of a number of factors influencing the
stakeholders’ decisions. A Decision Support System (DSS) is developed with the aid
of Microsoft Excel 2013, Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) programming language,
and the Precision Tree 5.5 for Excel add-in. The data for the model is obtained from a
case study of a wastewater treatment plant in Egypt. The results obtained from the
model are close to the ones obtained from the Independent Financial Expert (IFE) of
the wastewater treatment plant.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Figures ............................................................................................................ viii
List of Tables ................................................................................................................. x
List of Equations ........................................................................................................... xi
Chapter 1 : Introduction ................................................................................................. 1
1 . 1 Public Private Partnership (PPP) ........................................................................ 1
1 . 2 Importance of PPP .............................................................................................. 2
1 . 3 Problem Statement ............................................................................................. 3
1 . 4 Thesis Objective ................................................................................................. 3
1 . 5 Thesis Organization............................................................................................ 4
Chapter 2 : Literature Review ........................................................................................ 6
2 . 1 Evolution of the Public Private Partnership (PPP) ............................................. 6
2 . 2 Forms of PPP...................................................................................................... 7
2 . 3 Advantages and Disadvantages of PPP ............................................................ 10
2 . 4 PPP Payment Mechanisms ............................................................................... 13
2 . 4 . 1 User Charges............................................................................................ 13
2 . 4 . 2 Usage Payment ........................................................................................ 14
2 . 4 . 3 Availability Payment ............................................................................... 14
2 . 4 . 4 Monitoring and Control of Unplanned Payments in PPP Projects .......... 15
2 . 5 PPP Concession Period .................................................................................... 16
2 . 6 PPP Projects Risks ........................................................................................... 18
2 . 6 . 1 PPP Risk Management Process ............................................................... 19
2 . 6 . 2 Common Types of PPP Risks and Their Preferred Allocations .............. 24
Chapter 3 : Current Practice in Contract Renegotiation .............................................. 32
3 . 1 Current Practice ................................................................................................ 32
3 . 1 . 1 PPP Life Cycle......................................................................................... 32
3 . 1 . 2 The PPP Financial Model ........................................................................ 35
3 . 2 Contract Renegotiation..................................................................................... 36
v

3 . 2 . 1 Triggers of Renegotiation ........................................................................ 36
3 . 2 . 2 Frequency of Renegotiation..................................................................... 40
3 . 2 . 3 PPP Contract Renegotiation and the Re-equilibrium Model ................... 41
3 . 2 . 4 Results of Renegotiation .......................................................................... 42
3 . 3 Tools to Facilitate the Renegotiation Process .................................................. 44
3 . 3 . 1 Decision Support Systems (DSS) ............................................................ 44
3 . 3 . 2 Applications of DSS in PPP .................................................................... 45
3 . 4 Originality of Research .................................................................................... 46
Chapter 4 : Research Methodology.............................................................................. 48
4 . 1 Framework Development ................................................................................. 48
4 . 2 Prototype DSS Model....................................................................................... 49
4 . 2 . 1 The User-Interface Module ..................................................................... 51
4 . 2 . 2 The Risk Allocation Module ................................................................... 53
4 . 2 . 3 The PPP Valuation Module ..................................................................... 57
4 . 2 . 4 The Financial Model Re-equilibrium Module ......................................... 59
4 . 2 . 5 The Scenarios Development Module ...................................................... 61
4 . 2 . 6 The Scenarios Selection Module ............................................................. 64
4 . 2 . 7 The Reports Module ................................................................................ 67
4 . 2 . 8 The Sensitivity Analysis Module ............................................................ 68
Chapter 5 : Results Analysis, Verification and Validation .......................................... 70
5 . 1 The Waste Water Treatment Plant (Case Study) ............................................. 70
5 . 2 Results Analysis ............................................................................................... 72
5 . 2 . 1 The User-Interface Module ..................................................................... 72
5 . 2 . 2 The Risk Allocation Module ................................................................... 75
5 . 2 . 3 The PPP Valuation Module ..................................................................... 77
5 . 2 . 4 The Financial Model Re-equilibrium Module ......................................... 80
5 . 2 . 5 The Scenarios Development Module ...................................................... 84
5 . 2 . 6 The Scenarios Selection Module ............................................................. 89
5 . 2 . 7 The Reports Module ................................................................................ 95
5 . 2 . 8 The Sensitivity Analysis Module .......................................................... 102
5 . 3 The Prototype Model Verification and Validation ......................................... 108

vi

Chapter 6 : Conclusion............................................................................................... 111
6 . 1 Overview and Contributions .......................................................................... 111
6 . 2 Limitations ..................................................................................................... 112
References .................................................................................................................. 114
Appendix A – PPP Contract Renegotiation Decision Support System ..................... 121

vii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Private Sector Involvement (Kwak et al, 2009) ............................................. 8
Figure 2: Value for Money (VFM) of PPP (Skanska, 2004) ....................................... 11
Figure 3: PPP Project Life Cycle (Public Private Partnership Central Unit, 2009) ..... 32
Figure 4: PPP Agreement Structure (Kriegler, 2006) .................................................. 34
Figure 5: Proposed Framework Modules ..................................................................... 49
Figure 6: The Framework Sub-modules ...................................................................... 50
Figure 7: Modules Interrelation ................................................................................... 52
Figure 8: The Risk Allocation Module Interrelation with the Other Modules ............ 54
Figure 9: The PPP Valuation Module Interrelation with the Other Modules .............. 59
Figure 10: The Financial Model Re-equilibrium Module Interrelation with the Other
Modules........................................................................................................................ 60
Figure 11: The Scenarios Development Module Interrelation with the Other Modules
...................................................................................................................................... 61
Figure 12: The Scenarios Selection Module Interrelation with the Other Modules .... 65
Figure 13: Scenario Selection Criteria Decision Matrix (Pugh, 1991) ........................ 66
Figure 14: The Reports Module Interrelation with the Other Modules ....................... 67
Figure 15: The Sensitivity Analysis Module Interrelation with the Other Modules ... 69
Figure 16: DSS User-interface no.1 ............................................................................. 73
Figure 17: DSS User-interface no.2 ............................................................................. 73
Figure 18: DSS User-Interface no.2' ............................................................................ 74
Figure 19: Risks Default Table .................................................................................... 76
Figure 20: DSS User-interface no.3 ............................................................................. 77
Figure 21: Initial Payment Distribution ....................................................................... 79
Figure 22: Risk Factor Filtration.................................................................................. 79
Figure 23: DSS User-interface no.4 ............................................................................. 81
Figure 24: DSS User-interface no.5 ............................................................................. 82
Figure 25: Updated Payment Distribution ................................................................... 83
Figure 26: PPP Concession Value and Re-equilibrium Value at t = 0 ........................ 83
Figure 27: Re-equilibrium Scenarios Calculations ...................................................... 84
Figure 28: DSS User-interface no.6 ............................................................................. 86
Figure 29: The Preliminary Re-equilibrium Scenarios ................................................ 88
viii

Figure 30: The Final Re-equilibrium Scenarios........................................................... 88
Figure 31: Re-equilibrium Criteria .............................................................................. 90
Figure 32: Criteria and Sub-criteria Priorities ............................................................. 90
Figure 33: Criteria and Sub-criteria Decision Matrix .................................................. 92
Figure 34: Sub-criteria Ranking................................................................................... 93
Figure 35: Scenario Scores Calculations ..................................................................... 94
Figure 36: DSS User-interface no.7 ............................................................................. 95
Figure 37: Default Risk Allocation Chart .................................................................... 96
Figure 38: Private Sector Optimal Decision Tree ........................................................ 97
Figure 39: Private Sector Probability Chart ................................................................. 99
Figure 40: Private Sector Cumulative Chart .............................................................. 100
Figure 41: Private Sector Statistical Summary .......................................................... 101
Figure 42: Private Sector Policy Suggestion ............................................................. 101
Figure 43: 'Exchange Rate' Sub-criteria Rank Sensitivity Graph .............................. 102
Figure 44: 'Exchange Rate' Sub-criteria Rank Strategy Region ................................ 103
Figure 45: Private Sector Tornado Graph .................................................................. 104
Figure 46: Private Sector Spider Graph ..................................................................... 105
Figure 47: Two Way Sensitivity Graph ..................................................................... 106
Figure 48: Two Way Sensitivity Analysis Strategy Region ...................................... 107
Figure 49: Risk Allocation Percentage Error Message .............................................. 108

ix

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Components of PPP Arrangements ................................................................. 8
Table 2: Percentage of Renegotiated Contracts (Marques & Berg, 2010) .................. 41
Table 3: Renegotiation Outcomes (Guasch L., 2004).................................................. 43
Table 4: Qualitative and Quantitative PPP Risks Allocation (Badran, 2013) ............. 55
Table 5: Scenarios Percentage Variance .................................................................... 110

x

LIST OF EQUATIONS
Equation 1: PPP Pricing Equation (Xu et al, 2012) ..................................................... 43
Equation 2: The Effect of PPP Risks on the Pricing Equation (Xu et al, 2012).......... 44
Equation 3: PPP Valuation Equation ........................................................................... 58
Equation 4: Future Value given Present Value ............................................................ 63
Equation 5: Annuity given Present Value .................................................................... 63
Equation 6: Scenario Score .......................................................................................... 65

xi

CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION
1 . 1 Public Private Partnership (PPP)
Public Private Partnership (PPP) is recognized as a mechanism that achieves
cooperation between the public sectors and the private sectors. The agreement is usually
referred to as the “concession agreement” while the duration of the contract is the
“concession period”. The durations of PPP contracts tend to be very long compared to
other conventional delivery methods. The heart of PPP agreements is that the private
sector finances a PPP project on behalf of the public sector, with the project ownership
retained by the public sector, retained by the private sector or transferred to the public
sector at the end of the project. Moreover, PPP agreements also include design, build,
operate, maintain, develop, buy, or refurbish agreements. PPP contracts have many
types that are basically combinations of the previously mentioned agreements.
Examples of PPP contracts are design-build-finance-operate (DBFO) contracts, buildoperate-transfer (BOT) contracts, and build-own-operate (BOO) contracts.
The choice between the Public Private Partnership delivery method and other
conventional delivery methods depends on many factors that should be looked at
thoroughly. One of the main factors is the value for money (VFM). The value for money
is the difference between the project value that is incurred by the private sector in case
of choosing the PPP option and the project value if executed by the public sector.
Although the cost of borrowing for the private sector is usually much higher than the
cost of borrowing for the public sector, the PPP option, in many cases, may have a
higher value for money for several reasons, such as the ability of the private sector to
provide better and more efficient services than the public sector. Private sector knowhow is another reason for choosing a PPP approach. A value for money study should
be conducted to determine whether the PPP option is more efficient in the long run than
other procurement methods.
In order to assess the value for money, the private sector is required to submit a
financial model along with the bid that includes detailed calculations of all expected
costs and revenues for the project. On the other hand, the public sector prepares a public
sector comparator, which is a mirror of the private sector financial model but with the
1

public sector conducting the project by conventional procurement methods. If the
comparison between the two models proves that the value for money is higher in the
case of the private sector taking over the project, then the Public Private Partnership
option is to be chosen. The risk sharing mechanism provided by the PPP method and
the lower whole life cost of procuring services, which compensates for the higher cost
of finance in the private sector, are the reasons for the higher value for money in the
private sector option. Although the PPP option seems to be the expensive option, the
efficiency and quality provided the private sector usually lead to great savings for the
public sector.

1 . 2 Importance of PPP
As stated in the previous section, the public sector should only choose the PPP
option over conventional procurement methods when the private sector is providing a
better service with more efficiency; in other words, when the private sector is providing
a higher value for money (VFM).
In addition, governments strive to enhance the economic growth of their states.
This requires enhancing existing services and working on developing beneficial
strategic projects, such as infrastructure projects. According to the Construction
Management Association of America (CMAA), Public Private Partnership is one of the
mechanisms that governments employ to engage private sector financing in the
development process (The Construction Management Association of America, 2012) .
The importance of the Public Private Partnership approach is that it supports
and helps governments achieve their strategic plans in shorter time periods. The private
financing provided through the Public Private Partnership model helps in allocating
governmental funds to other strategic projects and services. This allows governments
to achieve a greater number of goals in a relatively short period of time with high
efficiency, which boosts the economic growth of the country.
Moreover, the Public Private Partnership contracts are based on service
availability, which means that the private sector is not to be paid unless the service is
being provided to the users according to the contract specifications. In other words, the
Public Private Partnership mechanism ensures that the private sector is not being paid
2

for an incomplete or insufficient service. Hence, the private sector is keen to provide
the service on time and according to the contract specifications in order to collect the
expected revenues as planned. This minimizes the probability of time delays and cost
overruns in PPP projects tremendously. Furthermore, Public Private Partnership
contracts can be of great benefit to the end users of a service. In order to maximize its
revenues, the private sector usually tries to provide the service earlier in the concession
period in order to increase the operation period, thereby increasing revenue.

1 . 3 Problem Statement
Despite all of the above benefits, PPP projects are very challenging in terms of
attracting investors to enter the bidding process. This is due to several factors; one of
which is the private sector’s fear of the long-term nature of PPP projects, which makes
it extremely difficult to anticipate contingencies along the projects’ lifecycles. Due to
the lengthy contract durations, the principles and bases upon which the original PPP
contract was made may no longer apply; they may be simply altered or totally changed
as the project evolves. A different set of conditions and situations may appear later in
the project, making the need for a contract re-equilibrium inevitable, and with reequilibrium comes renegotiation. During the renegotiation stage, conflicts may arise
between the different stakeholders of the project. These lengthy renegotiations become
full of conflicts that, in some cases, may lead to contract terminations and major losses
for several parties. However, those conflicts can be avoided through a pre-agreed
mechanism. Tools are needed to ease the lengthy renegotiation process. This thesis
provides a tool that facilitates a renegotiation process in which the interests of all parties
are considered in the final decision. This tool will help in attracting the private sector
to enter PPP contracts and ensure project continuity and stability of transactions.

1 . 4 Thesis Objective
Since the PPP contract renegotiation process seems to be an inevitability, the
goal of this research is to enhance and to support this process in order to make PPP
contracts more favorable to investors.
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Typically, there are four re-equilibrium scenarios that appear in a PPP contract:
increasing the service charges, increasing the concession period, paying a lump sum
amount to the private sector, or a combination of any of the above. The aim of those
scenarios is to maintain the contractual internal rate of return of the private sector fixed.
In order to enhance and to support the renegotiation process and to achieve the thesis
goal, the research objective is to develop a tool that provides a clear method of selection
from the common four re-equilibrium scenarios. This tool is a Decision Support System
model which ensures that the decision is unbiased and robust. In other words, it
increases transparency and stability of transactions by providing a pre-agreed
mechanism which enhances mutual trust between the PPP parties.
The decision to choose from among the above scenarios is affected by many
factors that exist in both the private and the public sectors. In order to achieve the thesis
objective and ensure that the optimum decision is taken, a Decision Support System
(DSS) is developed. This DSS model contains eight modules: a User-Interface Module,
a Risk Allocation Module, a PPP Valuation Module, a Financial Model Re-equilibrium
Module, a Scenarios Development Module, a Scenarios Selection Module, a Reports
Module, and a Sensitivity Analysis Module. The User-Interface Module serves to help
non-expert users interact easily with the tool, and the Risk Allocation Module reflects
the contractual allocations of the different projects risks in order to determine the
portions of the risks that will be considered in the renegotiation process. The PPP
Valuation Module and the Financial Model Re-equilibrium Module provide a basis for
the Scenarios Development Module calculations, which the latter develops the different
re-equilibrium scenarios. The Scenarios Selection Module uses the weighted sum
model to calculate the weights and the ranks of a number of factors influencing the
stakeholders’ decisions. The results of the DSS model are presented through the Reports
Module and the Sensitivity Analysis Module.

1 . 5 Thesis Organization
This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter One is the introduction to
Public Private Partnerships and their importance. It also includes the problem statement
and the thesis goal and objective.
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Chapter Two is a literature review of the concept of Public Private Partnerships
(PPP), the different forms of PPP, the advantages and disadvantages of PPP, the
different payment mechanisms, the PPP concession period, and the different PPP risks.
Chapter Three covers the current practice and the contract renegotiation. It
includes the PPP lifecycle and the components of the PPP financial model. It also
includes the renegotiation process and its frequency and outcomes. It also discusses the
tools to facilitate the renegotiation process, such as Decision Support Systems (DSS),
and examples of their applications in the PPP field.
Chapter Four presents the methodology of the research and an introduction of
the framework proposed. It also explains the inputs and outputs of the eight modules of
the prototype Decision Support System model.
Chapter Five evaluates the results and provides an analysis of the data obtained
from the Decision Support System of PPP contracts renegotiation of PPP. It also
incorporates an analysis of a case study of a wastewater treatment plant in Egypt, and
the verification and validation of the suggested framework.
Finally, Chapter Six is the summary and conclusion of the research findings. It
includes the contributions and the limitations of the research.
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CHAPTER 2 : LITERATURE REVIEW
2 . 1 Evolution of the Public Private Partnership (PPP)
The Canadian Council describes Public Private Partnership (PPP) as “a
cooperative venture between the public and private sectors, built on the expertise of
each partner, that best meets clearly defined public needs through the appropriate
allocation of resources, risks and rewards” (The Canadian Council, 2006). Public
Private Partnership is, as its name denotes, a partnership between the public sector,
which is usually represented in the government, and the private sector, which usually
consists of a consortium of construction and operation companies and investors. In this
context, the government awards a public project to the private sector in which the
agreement between the government and the private sector is called a “Concession
Agreement.” The government is usually referred to as the “Off-taker” while the private
sector is called the “Concessionaire” (Kriegler, 2006). The contractual period of the
agreement is also called the “Concession Period,” during which the Concessionaire has
to fulfill his obligations under the contract. The PPP agreement may include one or
more of the following components: design, build, finance, operate, maintain, own,
transfer, lease, develop, buy, or refurbish (Delmon, 2010).
The first PPP project was in 1782 in France, where a water distribution project
was awarded to Perrier (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002). Further cooperation between the
public and the private sectors can be traced to the 1970s, represented in privatizations
of many projects, especially in Europe, which continued to rise until the late 1980s
(Hood, 1991). However, the term “PPP” was not used until the 1990s (Davies &
Eustice, 2005). The use of PPPs began to rise in Europe, specifically in the United
Kingdom, where the term “PPP” was first used in 1997. The most successful PPP
programs today are found in the United Kingdom, where the value of the PPP projects
until 2008 was almost 63 billion British Pounds (Demirag et al, 2010). Furthermore,
PPPs continued to be used in Portugal, the Netherlands, Ireland, and many other
European countries. PPPs may also be traced to the 1980s in the United States
(Agyemang, 2011). As for South America, PPPs were highly evolving in Brazil and
Mexico. Moreover, Africa and Asia also started using PPPs, mainly in South Africa in
2001 and in Japan (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2004).
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Alhomadi, in his PhD dissertation entitled “Public-Private Partnership
Implementations in Saudi Arabia Infrastructure,” published in 2012, also suggested a
framework to enhance PPP practices in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by trying to reach
market maturity and avoid political and legal barriers (Alhomadi, 2012).
It has been noticed that PPPs emerge in developed countries in earlier stages
than in developing countries (Guan-Wei, 2010). This proves that the claim that PPPs
are only suitable for developing countries due to the lack of funds is not accurate.
Actually, PPPs can be very costly if not studied thoroughly. According to the United
Nations, the reason is that the government incurs costs, such as administrative and
transaction costs, in order to prepare bids, negotiate the contract terms, manage the PPP
contract along the life of the project, and provide monitoring (The United Nations,
2011). In addition, the cost of borrowing for the private sector is much higher than for
the public sector.
Moreover, Viegas, in his paper entitled “Questioning the Need for Full
Amortization in PPP Contracts for Transport Infrastructure,” claims that, in most cases,
PPP contracts have a relatively short concession period to reach full amortization,
which also leads to an increase of transaction costs (Viegas, 2010). To summarize, the
public sector should only choose the PPP option when the value for money is proven to
be higher; for instance, if the private sector provides better control and monitoring,
more advanced operation, or a higher level of know-how.

2 . 2 Forms of PPP
As mentioned above, PPP arrangement may include one or more of the
components in Table 1. PPP contracts include one or more of the following
components: design, build, finance, operate, maintain, own, transfer, lease, develop,
buy, or refurbish. The combinations of those trades usually vary depending on the level
of involvement of the private sector, the ownership status of an asset, and the source of
financing. For instance, if the difference between BOT contracts and BOO contracts is
the ownership of the asset (Kwak et al, 2009).
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Table 1: Components of PPP Arrangements
Form

Abbreviation

Form

Abbreviation

Form

Abbreviation

Design

(D)

Maintain

(M)

Develop

(D)

Build

(B)

Own

(O)

Buy

(B)

Finance

(F)

Transfer

(T)

Refurbish

(R)

Operate

(O)

Lease

(L)

PPP is a relatively new delivery method which is still developing and evolving.
The five most common types of PPP are Operation-Maintenance (OM), Design-BuildOperate (DBO), Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO), Build-Operate-Transfer
(BOT), and Build-Own-Operate (BOO). Figure 1 explains the level of involvement of
the private sector for those common types of PPP where the BOO represents the highest
level of involvement of the private sector and the OM represent the lowest.

Figure 1: Private Sector Involvement (Kwak et al, 2009)

The Build Operate Transfer (BOT) is the most common among the above types;
it is also referred to as Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO), Design-Build-Operate-Transfer
(DBOT), Build-Refurbish-Operate-Transfer (BROT), Build-Lease-Transfer (BLT),
and Turnkey (The United Nations, 2011). Build Operate Transfer (BOT) and its other
forms mean that “the private sector is responsible for finance, design, construction,
operation, and maintenance” (Kwak et al, 2009). It also means that the ownership rights
belong to the public sector as the private sector transfers ownership at the end of the
8

project. Another type is Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT), which during the project
the ownership of the asset belongs to the private sector; however, at the end of the
contract, the ownership is transferred to the public sector which can also be another
name for the BOT contracts.
On the other hand, Broadbent in his paper entitled “PPPs: Nature, Development
and unanswered Questions”, claims that the ownership of the asset during the execution
of a BOT contracts belong to the private sector as well (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2004).
Unlike BOT, Build-Own-Operate (BOO) is a PPP type in which the ownership of the
asset is transferred to the private sector.
In addition, Menendez, in his report entitled “Constrains and Opportunities for
PPP Transport Projects,” states that during Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) and
Design-Build-Operate (DBO) contracts, the ownership of the asset remains with the
public sector, which increases the level of involvement of the public sector (Menendez,
1998).
Public Finance Initiative (PFI) is another type of PPP, wherein the private sector
finances the delivery of an improved specific service for the government, and
ownership remains with the public sector, as well. In his paper entitled “Contract Issues
and Financing in PPP/PFI,” Palmer conducts a comparison between Design-BuildFinance-Operate (DBFO) and Design-Build-Operate (DBO) contracts. The paper
defines the criteria based upon which the public sector decides whether to use DBO or
DBFO contracts. The criteria depend on both the nature of the project and the
availability of funds in the public treasury of a country. Because of the continuous
evolution of new technologies and changing customer needs, a quick response is
required. Palmer recommends in such cases to avoid using the DBFO contracts, as the
financing component of this contract requires additional agreements and protocols with
a financing party, such as a bank. This additional link in the PPP chain would require
additional approvals in order to adjust any part of the PPP process to adhere to
technological changes. It would be more efficient to have fewer approvals in such cases.
Moreover, Palmer states that the DBO is better than the DBFO approach provided that
the government has sufficient funds to bear the project costs (Palmer, 2000).
The various types of PPPs can constitute either an opportunity or a risk for both
the public and the private sectors, as each type has advantages and disadvantages that
9

may be reversed depending on the nature of the PPP project. For example, opting for a
Build-Own-Operate (BOO) approach for a strategic project such as a nuclear plant
could have numerous disadvantages, as the public sector would hand the ownership of
such an important facility to the private sector. Hence, advantages and disadvantages
of a PPP should be studied thoroughly in order to ensure its feasibility for a certain
project.

2 . 3 Advantages and Disadvantages of PPP
Almost all of the other PPP advantages lead to the same conclusion: a better
value for money (VFM). According to Skanska in his report entitled “European
Commission Second International Workshop on PPPs,” the Net Present Value (NPV)
of a public project consists of the whole life cost of procuring services, the cost of
finance, and the cost of risks retained by the public sector, as shown in Figure 2
(Skanska, 2004). When going for the PPP option, the public sector reduces the whole
life cost of procuring services and the cost of risks retained by the public sector;
however, it increases the cost of finance.
According to Guan-Wei in his PhD dissertation entitled “The Bids-Evaluation
Model Development and Application for PPP Transport Projects: A Project Risk
Modeling Framework,” in order to make a PPP more beneficial, a balance should be
obtained to ensure that the summation of all the benefits and drawbacks achieves, in
the end, a positive value for the public sector: the value for money (Guan-Wei, 2010).
Herpen, in his paper entitled “Public Private Partnerships, the Advantages and
Disadvantages Examined,” states that the value for money is achieved due to several
factors. First, instead of the public sector bearing all the risks, the PPP approach allows
the public sector to transfer many risks to the private sector; moreover, PPP contracts
are output-based contracts, meaning that the private sector shall only be paid when
providing the service as per the specifications required. In addition, the private sector
is obliged to provide the public sector with the whole life cost of the project in advance,
despite the long-term nature of the PPP project. Due to all of the above, PPPs promote
cost efficiencies and provide improved service (Herpen, 2002).
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Figure 2: Value for Money (VFM) of PPP (Skanska, 2004)

Archer and Cameron, in their paper entitled “Making Public Private
Partnerships Work,” published results of a survey conducted by the National Audit
Office (NAO) of the United Kingdom. The survey included 37 PPP projects. Cost
overruns and time delays were estimated. The results indicated that almost 75 percent
of conventional procured projects suffer from cost overruns while less than 25 percent
of PPP projects suffer from cost overruns. The study also found that almost 24 percent
of PPP projects suffer from time delays. The conclusion showed that PPPs are more
efficient in terms of time and cost than conventional procurement methods (Archer &
Cameron, 2003).
In its report entitled “An Owner’s Guide to Project Delivery Methods,” The
Construction Management Association of America states that one of the main
advantages of PPPs are that they delay the need of the public sector to use the funds in
the public treasury. In other words, they allow the public sector to use the capital in the
public treasury for other projects and minimize the need for raising taxes to meet the
demands of infrastructure projects. However, the government should be very careful
when planning for future spending, considering the operation costs of PPP projects after
they are transferred to the government. Another advantage of PPPs are their quick
responses to customers’ needs, which are usually more efficient in the case of the userfees payment method. PPPs also provide an incentive and high potential for early
11

delivery of the service, as the private sector wants to maximize the operation period in
order to obtain higher profits. Many governments nowadays encourage the PPP option,
creating an atmosphere of mutual cooperation and a better work environment for the
private sector investors, which is another main advantage. The PPP option provides a
non-depleting source of resources to meet the public demand for new services and
infrastructure projects (The Construction Management Association of America, 2012).
The value for money (VFM) can be a great advantage of PPPs, as shown above;
however, if not studied thoroughly, it can be also a major disadvantage if the
conventional procurement methods become more efficient. PPPs have many additional
costs that the public sector must bear, such as tendering, administration and transaction
costs. Moreover, poor drafting of contract terms can lead to renegotiation, resulting in
the private sector being overpaid for the service. Again, the cost of borrowing for the
private sector is much higher than for the Public Sector, which also should be weighed
against the other gains of PPPs.
Katz, in his paper entitled “Financing Infrastructure Projects: Public Private
Partnerships (PPPs),” states that due to the length of PPP contracts, such contracts are
usually prone to renegotiation as a result of various unexpected contingencies that
might occur along the project lifecycle. In addition, it is very difficult to control the
performance of the private sector and its quick response to growing demand, especially
when the private sector is paid by the government rather than the user fees method. This
may lead to political issues due to the dissatisfaction of the service users. A PPP contract
may lose efficiency with time due to the fact that the project cannot be re-tendered,
which diminishes competition and the incentive to provide a better service (Katz, 2006).
In his report entitled “Granting Renegotiation Infrastructure Concessions:
Doing It Right”, Guasch states that the aim of PPPs is to encourage better private sector
quality and performance for the benefit of users. In the long run, the private sector
records efficiency gains that should be passed to the users in the form of lower tariffs.
However, it has been shown in different studies that these efficiency gains have a weak
correlation with tariffs and usually reflect on a minor portion of them. According to
Guasch, the efficiency gains are reflected only in 1 percent or less of the tariff value. In
some cases, the government chooses to obtain those efficiency gains indirectly by
increasing the taxes (Guasch L. , 2004).
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In summary, the idea of a PPP is to combine the expertise and resources of the
public and the private sectors in order to reach efficiency and value for money (VFM),
yet the above disadvantages along with insufficient feasibility studies and poor
decisions can turn a PPP from an advantageous method of delivering services to the
public sector into leading to undesired results.

2 . 4 PPP Payment Mechanisms
Payments in PPP contracts are made based on the service availability, or what
is called “verifiable outcomes,” and are not paid against the cost of materials or the
inputs of the process like other conventional contracts. In PPP project types where the
private sector performs the construction agreement, it will not be paid until the service
becomes available. Sometimes third parties are used to measure the output for the
purpose of the payment. The public sector has to be very careful to define clear tools to
measure the performance of PPP projects, especially if the output service is not as easy
to quantify or verify. Surveys may be conducted to measure the performance of a
project (Noble, 2006).

2 . 4 . 1 User Charges
This mechanism is used when the private sector is bearing the demand risk and,
therefore, is collecting the payments or revenues from the users directly, as in the case
of highways, bridges, or tunnel tolls. In determining the appropriate user charges, the
public sector should apply tariffs in a manner that ensures the project will earn sufficient
revenues to guarantee the bankability of the project. Sometimes it is necessary for the
public sector to provide some help to the private sector to maintain the bankability of
the project, such as providing a share of the capital expenditures (Capex) or grants.
Another method is to provide revenue support, which is a way to support the private
sector in cases of low demand during certain periods. Other governments may help with
the debt guarantees in case of a major drop in demand that prevents the private sector
from paying the debt at some stage (Noble, 2006).
In his paper “Contractual Structures and Risk Allocation and Mitigation in the
Context of Public Private Partnerships in the Health Sector,” Stemmer concluded that
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the public sector has to be very careful when providing subvention, as fixed subventions
are not recommended. In some cases, subventions decrease the performance of the
private sector as it will transfer some of the demand risks back to the public sector.
Hence, subventions should always be linked to the performance of the private sector.
In some cases, the public sector may try to limit private sector profits when it is proven
that the revenues are exceeding a certain boundary. One of the techniques of limiting
the revenues is sharing surplus revenue, especially if the public sector is providing
subventions. Another technique is capping revenues, but this may limit the private
sector from enhancing the service and attracting more users (Stemmer, 2008).

2 . 4 . 2 Usage Payment
The payment in this case is provided by the public sector itself to the private
sector for projects where it is known that the demand is not high enough to cover the
debt and provide sufficient revenues to the private sector. In order to do that, a
measurement tool has to be agreed upon between the two parties to measure the
performance. If performance measures are not linked to the payment, the demand risk
will be transferred to the public sector, which is not desirable and this makes it difficult
to ensure that the private sector has an incentive to maintain the quality of the service
until the end of the operation period. If the payments are made by users directly, this
may be shown as a measure of the quality of the service itself. Therefore, if the payment
is made by the government, the government has to take all necessary precautions to
ensure that the service is delivered in a proper way, as mentioned above (Noble, 2006).

2 . 4 . 3 Availability Payment
The contract should mention clearly the definition of the service availability in
order for the public sector to start paying the private sector for the service. Deductions
are made in case of service unavailability. In addition, in some contracts it is stated that
if within a certain period the private sector is able to rectify the service availability,
minor or no deductions shall be applied. On the contrary, a provision in the contract is
added for bonuses in case the private sector exceeds or enhances the performance level
agreed upon with the public sector.
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Sharma, in his PhD dissertation entitled “Design of Availability Payment
Mechanism for Public Private Partnerships,” developed a model that helps with
designing availability payment for PPP contracts. In such contracts, the public sector
usually defines an upper limit to the availability payment. Sharma’s model calculates
this upper limit, which guarantees that the public sector achieves its cost saving target
and, at the same time, assures the re-equilibrium of the financial state of the private
sector. The model also considers the different uncertainties and the financial state of
the private sector (Sharma, 2012).

2 . 4 . 4 Monitoring and Control of Unplanned Payments in PPP Projects
In order to apply the above, the private sector has to introduce a quality
management system to the project while the public sector shall review and monitor this
system in order to ensure the service availability and performance. As this is the case
in many countries, government officials may not be qualified or motivated enough to
apply such monitoring systems; hence, it is recommended to use an external
organization to perform the monitoring tasks for the public sector. This external
organization shall be paid by the public sector to avoid any conflict of interest that could
arise if it is paid by the private sector.
Spagnolo et al, in the report entitled “Contract Design in Public-Private
Partnerships,” states that in some projects, it is allowed for part of the facility to be
rented to a third party, which will constitute secondary revenue for the private sector.
If this has been accounted for in the bid price, then the private sector will earn such
revenue. However, if this is not the case, then the revenue shall be shared between the
public and the private sectors. Another source of unplanned revenue are price variations
to protect the private sector from bearing the risk of cost overruns, which prevent the
price from maximizing as a result of a huge mark up to account for such contingency.
In any case, the service charge should always be adjusted to ensure that it will cover
the financial obligations of the private sector. The contract has to state which “price
index” will be used when calculating the inflation changes; moreover, it should define
the “proportion of the tariff” or the part of the unitary payment to be affected by the
inflation changes. On the other hand, the public sector may require a provision in the
contract to protect itself when market prices decrease. (Spagnolo et al, 2007).
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2 . 5 PPP Concession Period
As it is important to design the contract to be flexible enough to absorb changes
and modifications in the project, as well as allow for an extension in the concession
period to absorb the effects of such changes.
Meunier and Quinet, in their paper entitled “Tips and Pitfalls in PPP Transport
Projects” stated that the contract duration should be designed very carefully in order to
avoid unnecessary long concession periods, which constitute a greater risk for the
private sector to forecast the future demand versus cost. In the case of a unitary payment
mechanism, when determining the contract duration, it has to be connected with the
amount of investment by the private sector and the unitary payments versus the residual
value of the project assets. For example, if project assets will be given to the private
sector after the completion of the project, then the duration of the contract should be
relatively shorter in order to account for the residual value of the asset. In the case of a
user charges payment mechanism, the contract duration is greatly connected with the
amount of revenues expected along the project life. For contracts in which the cost of
the projects depends on the condition of the assets and cannot be determined at the
contract design stage, it is recommended to lengthen the contract duration to encourage
the private sector to take on the project. However, in some countries there exist rules
and regulations to limit the contract durations to certain number of years; for instance,
in Chile, as well as Egypt, the concession period shall not exceed 30 years while in Italy
it shall not exceed 50 years (Meunier & Quinet, 2010).
Albalate and Bel propose variable term contracts for PPP projects in their paper
entitled “Regulating Concessions of Toll Motorways: An Empirical Study on Fixed vs.
Variable Term Contracts.” Albalate and Bel encourage the use of variable term
contracts over the ordinary term contracts. Variable term contracts are contracts in
which the concession period is not defined by a limited number of years but by certain
conditions. The type that Albalate and Bel suggest is the Least Present Value of
Revenue (LPVR) or the Least Present Value of Net Revenue (LPVNR). In those
contracts, the concessionaire delivers the project back to the public sector after reaching
a certain discounted value of revenue. This type of contract eliminates many
disadvantages of the ordinary PPP contracts and tremendously minimizes the
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probability of renegotiation. Despite the effectiveness of variable term contracts, they
are rarely used in PPP projects nowadays (Albalate & Bel, 2009).
Bel et al, in their paper entitled “Public-Private Partnerships: Infrastructure,
Transportation and Local Services,” suggested that where the market is small with a
low number of competitors, it is ideal to offer long contract durations in order to
encourage a competitive atmosphere rather than internal agreements between the
different competitors. On the other hand, if the market is unlikely to unify and there
exists a spirit of competition between the different bidders, it is better to use short-term
contracts, as these encourage originality and innovation, which usually lead to cost
savings and quality enhancement. Another incentive that can be used is contract
renewal based on the private sector performance. The shorter the contract duration, the
greater the frequency of renewal, which constitutes a larger incentive for the private
sector (Bel et al, 2013).
Vassallo, in his paper entitled “Traffic Risk Mitigation in Highway Concession
Projects: The Experience of Chile,” stated that the contract duration can be determined
on the basis of the Least Present Value of Revenue (LPVR). In this case, when the
LPVR is reached, the contract expires automatically. He concluded that some bidding
options, such as the Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG) and the Revenue Distribution
Mechanism (RDM) as well as the Least Present Value of Revenue (LPVR), decrease
the probability of renegotiation (Vassallo, 2006).
In his PhD dissertation entitled “A Real Options Model for the Financial
Valuation of Infrastructure Systems under Uncertainty,” Kashani developed a model
that estimates the value of the above measures. In his model, he was able to estimate a
value for the Minimum Revenue Guarantee (MRG), or a price cap to be defined by the
public sector. Kashani's measures took the demand risk into consideration and used
Monte Carlo simulation with the aid of stochastic processes to develop his model
(Kashani, 2012).
Shen et al, in their paper entitled “Alternative Concession Model for Build
Operate Transfer Contract Projects,” produced a model that can give an estimate of the
optimum concession period in such contracts. Their model balances both the investor
and the government interests, which makes this type of contract more efficient and
appealing (Shen et al, 2002). Shen and Wu improved the model in their paper titled
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“Risk Concession Model for Build/Operate/Transfer Contract Projects.” In this model,
they focused on different risks and their effects on the concession period. An investor
has to account for the risks that may cause any delay or cost overrun to the project and
increase the concession period to account for those risks. They used a hypothetical case
to apply the project, which can be very misleading in terms of adjusting the variables
to get the desired results. Because cash flows of a project cannot be a deterministic
value, Shen et al used Monte Carlo simulation to model the effect of the different risks
on the project cash flow (Shen & Wu, 2005).
In “The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public
Sector,” Gagnepain et al also stress the importance of increasing the concession period
in order to make sure that the investor is getting fair returns on investment. This will
minimize the probability of a contract renegotiation later in the project (Gagnepain et
al, 2013).
Liou and Huang, in their paper entitled “Automated Approach to Negotiations
of BOT Contracts with the Consideration of Project Risk,” used the Monte Carlo
simulation to produce a contractual-negotiation model. They also studied how the
model would vary in case of high and low risk profiles. A conclusion was reached that
a sponsor or an investor should be given a longer concession period in the case of a
high risk profile project (Liou & Huang, 2008).

2 . 6 PPP Projects Risks
One of the major triggers of PPP renegotiation is the inability to predict and
account for all the contingencies in the contract design stage; hence, PPP risks should
be studied carefully. In their Procedure Manual, the Water Services Training Group in
Ireland states that one of the main advantages of the Public Private Partnership approach
is that it provides a better risk allocation approach for both the private sector and the
government. Allocating risks to the party that is able to mitigate them is a good practice
to help in attracting the private sector to engage in PPP projects. Transferring too many
risks to the private sector may not be in favor of the PPP project and may cause the
private sector to fail to meet the obligations of the contract. Moreover, some risks
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cannot be transferred to the private sector, such as the political risks in the case that the
service did not satisfy public needs (Water Services Training Group, 2012).
PPP risks have major effect on deciding whether or not to choose the PPP
delivery method. Checherita, in her PhD dissertation entitled “A Macroeconomic
Analysis of Investment under Public-Private Partnerships and its Policy Implications the Case of Developing Countries,” has developed a model to help in deciding whether
to invest in a PPP project or not. The conclusion of the study was that some risks, such
as exchange rates and public investment risks, have a great impact on the choice to
invest in a PPP. Other factors affecting the decision were the degree of experience of
the different parties, the economic condition of a country, and the degree of aid provided
by the public sector (Checherita C. , 2009).

2 . 6 . 1 PPP Risk Management Process
2 . 6 . 1 . 1 PPP Risk Identification
In his paper entitled “Risks and Guarantees in BOT Tender”, Tiong stated that,
“Unpredictability is the kiss of death in BOT project financing” (Tiong, 1995). In order
to minimize unpredictability, great concern should be given to the risk identification
phase in risk management. In order for the risks to be identified, they have to be
categorized either by project phases or by their type. In general, PPP project phases
consists of bid phase, negotiation with preferred bidders, construction phase,
operational phase, and transfer of asset phase. Risks can also be defined by their type,
such as site risk, design, construction and commissioning risk, sponsor and financial
risk, operating risk, market risk, network and interface risk, industrial relations risk,
legislative and government policy risk, force majeure risk, asset ownership risk, etc.
Chan et al published a paper entitled “Potential Obstacles to Successful
Implementation of Public-Private Partnerships in Beijing and the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.” In their paper, Chan et al identified the main risks affecting
the PPP projects in Beijing and Hong Kong and compared them with the ones in the
United Kingdom. They conducted a survey to identify the top risks in the PPP field.
The results of the survey were that two of the major risks in both Beijing and Hong
Kong are the long period of renegotiation and the delays due to political debate. One of
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the top risks in Beijing was also the lack of experience and sufficient skills for managing
PPPs, while in Hong Kong, it was the low number of concessions reaching the award
phase (Chan et al, 2010).

2 . 6 . 1 . 2 Risk Assessment
Risks have to be assessed and studied carefully in order to allocate them to the
suitable party and choose a suitable risk mitigation mechanism. The likelihood of the
occurrence of a risk should be calculated carefully. This is not an absolute figure, as it
is affected by many factors, one of which is the question of whether this risk is to be
allocated to the public or the private sector. Another factor to consider is the effect of
such risk if it materializes. In other words, some risks may have a high probability of
occurrence, yet they have such a minor effect on the project that they can be neglected.
Fischer et al, in their paper entitled “An Integrated Risk Management System (IRMS)
for PPP Projects,” stated that the risk management process is very complicated,
especially in PPP projects. They conducted a questionnaire of 53 German PPP experts
to evaluate the risk management status. The result showed that industry practitioners
prefer to use qualitative techniques of risk assessment over more complicated
techniques, such as simulation methods. Moreover, industry experts do not rely totally
on the results of risk assessment due to the lack of transparency and accuracy (Fischer
et al, 2010).
Tolani, in his PhD dissertation entitled, “An Examination of Risk Perceptions
and Allocation Preferences in Public-Private Partnerships in Nigeria,” conducted a
questionnaire aiming to compare the comprehension of PPP risks by the private sector,
the public sector and the bank. Tolani argued that the different parties of a PPP project
perceive risks differently. However, the questionnaire results indicated that apart from
poor workmanship risk, the three players had the same comprehension of the different
PPP risks in Nigeria. The researcher conducted the same process in China and obtained
the same result except for the corruption risk. This indicates that the private sector, the
public sector and the bank have almost the same risk assessment of the different PPP
risks (Tolani, 2013).
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In their paper entitled “Evaluating the Risks of Public Private Partnerships for
Infrastructure Projects,” Grimsey and Lewis stress the need for assessing risks in PPP
projects. Grimsey and Lewis developed a computer-aided model providing a
framework for the process of evaluating the different risks from the perspective of the
public sector, the private sector, and the lenders. They applied their framework to a case
study of a wastewater treatment plant in Scotland and found that the objectives of the
framework were achieved (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002).
On the other hand, from the lender’s point of view, many risks are considered
important. Demirag et al, in their paper entitled “Risks and Financing of PPP:
Perspectives from the Financiers,” study PPP risks from the perspective of the lender.
They conducted a survey sent to 109 experts in PPP debt and equity, and almost 40
percent responded. The survey results showed that the lenders usually prefer that all
risks are either insured or allocated. Moreover, the survey also proved that lenders
usually go for an investment environment that they are aware of or worked in before,
whether by working with the same institutions, the same type of projects, or in the same
region. (Demirag et al, 2011).

2 . 6 . 1 . 3 Risk Allocation
The goal of risk allocation is to reach the optimum value of the project; in other
words, the lowest contract price. If risks are allocated to the private sector while the
public sector is the party who can control and predict such risks, then the private sector
would have a very high contingency, resulting in an unnecessary increase in the bid
price. This happens first by choosing the type of contract that would help in assigning
the right risks to the party that is best suited to handle such risk. “Proactive contracting”
is a term used by Tieva and Junnonen in their paper entitled “Proactive Contracting in
Finnish PPP Projects,” which means that the allocation criteria of PPP risks should be
defined in clear terms in the PPP contract. The allocation criteria may include
insurances, securities, or guarantees. An example of allocation of political risk and the
necessity of obtaining governmental guarantees was used by Tieva and Junnonen
(Tieva & Junnonen, 2009).
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In the Partnership Victoria model, the government only pays the private sector
for the output, which means that all risks that have to do with construction are allocated
to the private sector. Given the above, governments should also take over the risks that
they can handle the best in order to reach the optimal risk allocations. In the case of
risks over which neither party has control, it is better to go with a shared approach in
order to avoid high risk premiums if the full risk allocated to the private sector. In
general, it should be allocated to the party which can best mitigate the rick. It is also
recommended to relate the payment mechanism to the risk allocation, meaning that,
“No service, No payment.” In other words, payments should not start before the service
is delivered to users, as this is an incentive for the private sector to complete the project
according to the specifications of the government (Department of Treasury and
Finance, 2001).
Ke et al, in their paper entitled “Preferred Risk Allocation in China's PublicPrivate Partnership,” focused on China’s Private Public Partnership projects, and how
the different risks should be allocated to the different contractual parties. The research
was conducted with the help of a two-round Delphi survey. Based on the survey results,
37 risks were defined, and only one risk should be totally allocated to the government:
the risk of ‘‘expropriation and nationalization.” Twelve risks are mostly allocated to the
public sector including, ‘‘land acquisition” and ‘‘approval and permit.” Fourteen risks
are shared equally between the public and the private sectors including
’‘ground/weather conditions” and ‘‘force majeure” (Ke et al, 2010).
In “VFM and Risk Allocation Models in Construction PPP Projects” Li et al
conducted a survey to gather results of both qualitative and quantitative risk allocation
of PPP risks. In other words, it gathers information of the different types of PPP risks
and the percentages of the risks allocated to the private sector, the public sector, or
shared (Li et al, 2001).
Li et al published another paper entitled “The Allocation of Risk in PPP/PFI
Construction Projects in the UK” in 2005. Li et al studied the Private Finance Initiative
(PFI) which has the advantages of Private Public Partnership, yet it also transfers risk
away from the public sector. A survey was conducted to define which risks should be
allocated to the public sector and which to the investor. Risks were categorized into
three categories: macro-level risks, such as macroeconomic risks; meso-level risks such
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as construction and operation risks; and micro-level risks, such as coordination risks.
Macro and micro-level risks are advised to be allocated to the public sector or shared
with the private sector. While PPP/PFI projects usually contain meso-level risks, it is
advised to allocate them to the private sector (Li et al, 2005).
Badran, in her thesis entitled “Risk Analysis and Contract Management for
Public Private Partnership Projects in Egypt,” also discussed the allocation of the
different PPP risks in Egypt. Badran gathered 59 risks from the academic literature and
conducted a survey to define the critical risk groups. She also developed a risk matrix
with the different PPP risks and their recommended allocations (Badran, 2013).
Finally, it has been advocated that PPP risk allocation is not a straightforward
decision. In their paper entitled “Perceived Risk Allocation in Public-Private-Partnered
(PPP) Water Supply Projects in Indonesia,” Wibowo and Mohamed conducted a survey
aiming to gather experts’ opinions about the allocation of the different risks of the water
services-related PPP projects. The survey included 39 project risks that were grouped
in six risk categories. Thirty-four experts who hold managerial positions in the water
services-related companies responded to the questionnaire. The results were totally
different from one questionnaire to the other, reflecting a large variance of who should
bear certain risks. The risk transfer is one of the huge advantages of PPP; however, risk
allocation requires further study in order to guarantee the success of PPP projects
(Wibowo & Mohamed, 2008).

2 . 6 . 1 . 4 Risk Mitigation
The goal of risk mitigation is to reduce both the probability of a risk occurrence
and the effect on different contractual parties if a risk materializes. Both the private and
the public sectors have different mitigation mechanisms. The private sector
mechanisms include passing the risks to a third party. As an example, the
concessionaire usually passes the design and construction risks to a design and build
contractor. An example of another famous mechanism is insurance. The public sector
mechanisms are similar to those of the private sector. The public sector usually appoints
different consultants or advisors in the different fields of the project, such as legal,
financial, and technical consultants, (Delmon, 2010).
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Li et al published another paper entitled “Risk Treatment Preferences for
PPP/PFI Construction Projects in the UK” in 2004. In their paper, Li et al discuss the
different risk mitigation techniques. They recommend the use of risk retention and risk
transfer over the use of risk avoidance and risk reduction when dealing with PPP risks
(Li et al, 2004).

2 . 6 . 1 . 5 Monitoring and Review
Monitoring and reviewing is the most important phase of risk management, as
it ensures the effectiveness of the plan. It is significant to ensure that the risk
management plan expresses all risks that can be identified in a certain project.
Moreover, the process should not only guarantee that the mitigation plans are being
followed and identify critical phases and deadlines, but also ensure its effectiveness and
viability along the different phases of the project. In addition, the plan should
continuously update the probabilities and impacts of each risk, and calculate its
mitigation costs, as well. The reviewing process should also monitor the resources that
should be available at certain times to deal with the risks (Noble, 2006).

2 . 6 . 2 Common Types of PPP Risks and Their Preferred Allocations
There are many types of risks, some of which are associated with a specific
project and others which apply to almost any project. Both types should be considered
when preparing the risk matrix for a PPP project.

2 . 6 . 2 . 1 Statutory Risk
Examples of statutory risks are land acquisition, permits, and compensations in
the case of the land not being owned by the government. The public sector is the best
party to control such risk, more so than the private sector, as in most cases, the public
sector will carry out such tasks before the tender stage. In some countries, such as Latin
America, the public sector cannot bear the statutory risks as it lacks the know-how and
the technical capabilities to be competent to carry such risks. On the other hand, the
private sector has no control over such risks; it will have to increase the contingency
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allowance, which increases the unitary charges. In this case, it is optimum for the public
sector to carry statutory risk. Li et al introduce the case study of YD2nd Tunnel in
Shanghai, China in their paper “The Allocation of Risk in PPP/PFI Constructions
Projects in the UK.” During the mentioned project, the public sector chose to carry the
statutory risk. Li et al recommend that the public sector carries the statutory risks,
whether by using “in house” expertise or an external consultant, but bearing in mind
that, at some point in time, the public sector should gain knowledge from such
consultant in order to better handle the risks on its own (Li et al 2005).

2 . 6 . 2 . 2 Legislative Risk
Legislative risk is the risk that the government will change a law or a policy that
will impact the project in a negative way. According to Dong, the government chooses
to allocate this risk to the private sector. The private sector might deal with those
changes in laws and minimize their effect on the project by passing the effect of such
risk to the users through increasing the service charges. However, if the service is
provided by the government itself, the private sector would opt to share the legislative
risk with the public sector (Dong, 2010).

2 . 6 . 2 . 3 Output Specifications Risk
Iossa et al, in their report entitled “Best Practices on Contract Design in PublicPrivate Partnerships,” stated that the output specifications are usually defined by the
public sector during the pretender stage of the project. It is recommended that the output
specifications risk be allocated to the public sector to serve as a motivation for the
experts in the tender committee to spend time and effort to avoid any mistakes that
might occur in the output specifications and appear later during the design stage.
However, this might not be sufficient motivation for the public sector officials as,
simply, the public sector officials may lack the financial and technical capabilities. In
addition, PPP projects last for a long period of time, and mistakes are more likely to be
discovered at a later stage, at which point the government employee responsible for
them may have changed jobs already. Hence, the public sector should appoint
consultants or an external advisory committee to produce the specifications of the
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output requirements in order to be held accountable and carry such risks in case of an
error discovered in a later stage of the project (Iossa et al, 2007).

2 . 6 . 2 . 4 Design, Planning and Construction Risk
In most of the cases, government interference during the design and the
construction stage is minimal. The design, planning, and construction risk includes the
design stage, the planning stage, the construction stage, the commissioning stage, and
the operation stage. All of the above should be allocated to the private sector to work
as a motivation to perform its obligations and duties under the contract agreement. The
private sector should plan for any event that might result in a cost or a time over-run,
or in mistakes in the design. Moreover, it should plan for any potential risks that would
result in unavailability or inadequacy of the service provided. In some circumstances,
the risk sharing mechanism between the public and the private sectors is used,
especially when dealing with renovation projects, as the government in this case would
be the party who can evaluate the conditions of the existing assets and predict the
probability of occurrence of relevant risks (Stemmer, 2008).

2 . 6 . 2 . 5 Demand Risk
In their paper entitled “Private Concession Contracts for Toll Roads in Spain:
Analysis and Recommendations,” Baeza and Vassallo state that the demand risk is one
of the main reasons for renegotiation. Demand risks can be allocated to the private
sector, the public sector, or shared between the two of them depending on the nature of
the demand in different PPP projects. For projects in which the users pay for the service,
the demand risk is best allocated to the private sector, as it is the sector that can best
quantify such risk. For projects wherein the public sector pays the private sector a
unitary charge, the demand risk is best allocated to the public sector, as it is the one in
control of the demand, such as in the case of prisons. Finally, in projects where the
private sector depends on cash forecasts and cannot predict accurately the expected
demand, such as infrastructure projects such as a road or a bridge, it is better to reach a
risk sharing mechanism between the public and the private sectors (Baeza & Vassallo,
2010).
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2 . 6 . 2 . 6 Price Risk
The price risk is the risk that the value of the service or the service charges will
change from the base charge assumed at the beginning of the project. This can occur
due to reasons such as an economic crisis, a change in government practices, new
competition or substitutes entering the market, competitors lowering their prices, new
preferences of the target market, or simply the service becomes outdated. The Office
for Official Publications of the European Communities, in their report entitled “Long
Term Contracts between Government Unites and Nongovernment Partners,” states that
the allocation of such risk varies depending on the nature of the project and whether the
private sector deals with the users directly or through the government. In general, it is
expected that the public sector is the best party able to quantify that risk, and it may, in
an indirect way, change some of the public needs themselves. However, it is also
recommended to introduce a risk sharing technique to involve the private sector in the
equation, as it is the best party to assess the different ways to satisfy the public’s needs
as they arise. In order to mitigate this risk, a precise forecast should be developed to
predict the demand and the market conditions of a certain service (Office for Official
Publications of the European Communities, 2004).

2 . 6 . 2 . 7 Financial Risk
One type of financial risk is the possibility that a project will suffer a lack of
funds at some period in time due to insufficient debt or equity. Other financial risks are
a change in the prices of project elements prices, as well as the risk that the bidders
have lowered their prices due to a competitive market to the extent that the private
sector will not be able to fulfill its duties under the contract.
It is recommended to allocate the financial risk to the private sector, as it is the
best party to deal with financial risks. This is a motivation for the private sector to avoid
importing many foreign resources, and it serves on the domestic level to mitigate such
risk as investors will try to use local suppliers. The public sector may also apply tariffs
to the exchange rates in order to encourage the private sector to go to the local market
instead. In the case of developing countries where importing cannot be avoided, the
exchange rate risk should be allocated to the public sector. Moreover, the government
usually prefers to allocate tax risks and the like to the private sector. However, unlike
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several other references, Iossa et al maintain that the risks that have to do with changes
in the price of project parameters, including for example a change in the interest rate,
are shared between the public and the private sectors, but the public sector carries the
larger share of the risk. The government can also mitigate the risk of the private sector
underbidding the project by closely monitoring the bidding process and the market
conditions at that time. In other words, the government should make sure that the shortlisted bidders are able to fulfill the contract and not merely choose the lowest bidder
without ensuring that the bid is the actual fair value of the project (Iossa et al, 2007).

2 . 6 . 2 . 8 Investment Risk
Pantelias, in his PhD dissertation entitled “A Methodological Framework for
Probabilistic Evaluation of Financial Viability of Transportation Infrastructure Under
Public Private Partnerships,” defined the investment or sponsor risk as the risk that the
private sector or its subcontractors fail to fulfill their duties and obligations in the
contract; moreover, the government is unable to interfere and force the private sector
to fulfill these obligations. This risk can be a result of a change in ownership in the
private sector. In order to mitigate this risk, the government should ensure that the
contract contains provisions to obtain the government consent before any change in the
ownership of the private sector. The government should ensure that the new owner will
be able to fulfill the contractual obligations. In this case, it is preferred that this risk be
allocated to the public sector, as the private sector cannot regulate this type of risk
(Pantelias, 2009).

2 . 6 . 2 . 9 Residual Value Risk
The residual value risk includes any damage of the facilities, a technology
change that will result in the asset being obsolete, or simply the appearance of a
substitute or competition. It is crucial for the public sector to ensure that the asset will
be in good shape at the end of the concession period, which is why the public sector
should put a provision in the contract to ensure that part of the payment to the private
sector is retained against the condition of the asset at the end of this period. This risk
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shall be allocated to the private sector as a motivation to ensure the quality of the asset
at the end of the concession period (Engel et al, 2009).

2 . 6 . 2 . 10 Macroeconomic Risk
Checherita and Gifford, in their paper entitled “Risk Sharing in Public-Private
Partnerships: General Considerations and an Evaluation of the U.S. Practice in Road
Transportation,” list the different PPP related risks and their preferred allocation. One
of the risks introduced is the macroeconomic risk. An example of macroeconomic risk
is the financial crisis of 2008. Macroeconomic risk is a risk that occurs on a wide scale
and affects the economy globally. It can come in many forms, such as a crisis in the
exchange rates or a severe financial crisis. Macroeconomic risk is better allocated to an
insurer, or at least to the public sector, as it cannot be controlled by the private sector.
Macroeconomic shocks and financial crises affect a concession contract enormously,
as most of the operator’s obligations and investment are in foreign currency while it
collects its revenues in local currency (Checherita & Gifford, 2007).

2 . 6 . 2 . 11 Operation Risk
Operation risk is the risk of failing to deliver the service as per the contract due
to a fault in a certain element in the operation process, or simply due to cost over-runs.
The public sector prefers to allocate this risk to the private sector, as the level of
intervention of the government is preferred to be kept minimal at this stage. In order to
mitigate this risk, the government should carefully draft clear service output
requirements. The private sector should forecast future plans for the service, and predict
the change in the different operation requirements, if any. Those future plans should be
mentioned in the contract to give the private sector flexibility to adjust the operation
process in order to upgrade the existing process to meet those new requirements (Garg,
2012).
However, Iossa and Martimort, in their paper entitled “Risk Allocation and the
Costs and Benefits of Public-Private Partnerships,” stated that when the operation risk
is very high, it better not to use the PPP option and combine the design with the
execution of the service. In other words, in the case of a complex project, the
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government would not be able to anticipate the project costs and operation
contingencies in advance; hence, transferring the operation risk to the private sector is
not the optimum solution (Iossa & Martimort, 2012).

2 . 6 . 2 . 12 Network Risk
PPP projects are usually large projects that deal with many parties to deliver the
service. The private sector does not only deal with the public sector or the financiers,
but also with many other parties, building a network. This network can include more
than one PPP project, as well as some other parties that support the PPP projects. The
network risk is the risk that any part of this network may not function properly, thus
affecting the service delivery. For example, in the case of a water treatment plant, the
private sector would collaborate with a water company to provide water for the
treatment process. The failure of this water company to deliver water to the treatment
plant will affect the service and, as a result, is a network risk. This risk should be
allocated to the public sector, as the public sector is the only party that can coordinate
with all the parties in the network. In order to mitigate this risk, during the pretender
stage, the public sector should study carefully the relationships and dependencies
between the different parties of the network; moreover, the government should make
sure that the needs of the new project will be met (Hegazy & Wassef, 2001).
Jenkin, in his PhD dissertation entitled “Multiple-Case Examinations of
Complex Decisions to Form Networked Public-Private Partnerships,” was able to
determine the factors affecting the decisions of PPP officials. Those factors should help
in eliminating the network risk. The factors included economic and political factors that
should be studied carefully to suit both the public and the private sectors. Moreover,
the level of know-how required by the specifications of the service delivered by the
PPP is another factor. Low turnover rates, risks allocation, and parties’ reputations
should also be considered in order to mitigate the network risk (Jenkins, 2012).

2 . 6 . 2 . 13 Interface Risk
The network risk deals with the broader network that the PPP project is part of,
but the interface risk is about the inner network within the PPP project itself. The
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interface risk is the risk that the process of delivering the service will in some way
prevent the core service from being delivered to the users. An example is the
sterilization process in a hospital where the time needed to accomplish this process will
affect the delivery of the service to the hospital users. Such risk should be allocated to
the private sector in order to ensure that the private sector will coordinate between the
different players and make sure that the service is being delivered as per the contract
(Archer & Cameron, 2003).

2 . 6 . 2 . 14 Force Majeure Risk
Force majeure risk is any event that would prevent the private sector from
fulfilling its obligations in the contract, provided that this event is out of control of both
the private and the public sectors. The public sector would prefer that this risk be
allocated to the private sector. The private sector is asked to provide insurance for such
risk as a way to mitigate it; however, if the cost of such insurance is very high or
unreasonable, the risk is allocated to the public sector instead (Kashani, 2012).
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CHAPTER 3 : CURRENT PRACTICE IN CONTRACT
RENEGOTIATION
3 . 1 Current Practice
3 . 1 . 1 PPP Life Cycle
The lifecycle of PPP projects consists of seven phases. The PPP lifecycle starts
with identification of the project of interest. Then, the client or the government should
prepare a feasibility study, followed by the pre-qualification stage, and finally bidding
the project. Then, both the client and the service provider start the negotiation stage,
which leads to contract signing, after which the contract management stage continues
until the end of the project lifecycle. The PPP project lifecycle is shown in Figure 3,
which is prepared by the Public Private Partnership Central Unit in Egypt (Public
Private Partnership Central Unit, 2009).

Phase I: Project Initiation &
Screening
Phase II: Business Case
Phase III: Risk Assessment,
VFM Analysis & PSC
Phase IV: Tendering &
Procurement
Phase V: Bid Selection
Phase VI: Contract Signing &
Financial Closure
Phase VII: Post-Award
Performance Monitoring

Figure 3: PPP Project Life Cycle (Public Private Partnership Central
Unit, 2009)
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Phase one of the PPP project lifecycle is the project initiation and screening,
which answers the question of whether to proceed with the PPP delivery method or not.
Phase two provides a detailed business case. This includes defining the exact scope and
output specifications of the PPP project. It also includes a detailed technical, financial,
economic, legal, and environmental feasibility studies. Phase three is concerned with
the PPP affordability and risk assessment, which is done through developing a value
for money (VFM) analysis and the Public Sector Comparator (PSC). In his paper
entitled “Public Sector Comparator for Highway PPP Projects,” Kerali defines the
Public Sector Comparator (PSC) as a detailed study of calculating the PPP lifecycle
cost in case the public sector decides to pursue conventional procurement methods,
providing that it will deliver the same output specifications and quality of the private
sector. The Public Sector Comparator (PSC) should account for the costs incurred by
the private sector, such as the opportunity cost of public assets in the project; moreover,
it should be adjusted for the interest rate, taking into consideration the inflation and any
subsidies as well (Kerali, 2009).
If the PSC proves that the PPP option is more efficient, the project moves to
phase four. Phase four is the tendering and procurement of the PPP project. This phase
starts with issuing the Expression of Interest (EOI), followed by issuing the Information
Memorandum and the pre-qualification documents. After receiving the forms from
interested bidders, the bidding documents are prepared and sent to bidders in order to
receive their final proposal. Another difference between PPP and conventional
procurement methods is the bidder company. PPP requires the formation of a new entity
called the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), which usually consists of a consortium of
several companies (generally financial, construction, and operation companies). The
SPV is formed for the purpose of conducting a single PPP project only. Moreover, in
some rare cases, the public sector can be part of the consortium in exchange for shares.
Phase five is the most important of all phases: the bidder selection. There are
many methods for the bidder selection phase; however, the most common technique is
the two-envelope method. In this method, the bidders submit two sealed envelopes: a
technical bid and a financial bid. The technical bid is to be opened at the beginning to
exclude unqualified bidders, followed by the financial bids of the qualified bidders
only. After comparing the financial models submitted by the different bidders to the
Public Sector Comparator (PSC), the winning bidder is selected and notified.
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Phase six is the contract signature and financial closure, which includes the
implementation of Conditions Precedent. Phase seven is the post-award, monitoring
which continues till the end of the project lifecycle. During the execution of the PPP
project, the concessionaire usually does not receive any operation payments until the
construction phase is completed and the facility is ready to be operated. The payment
can be in a form of service charges paid by the government, fees paid by the users of
the service, or a combination of both. In general, the concessionaire usually
subcontracts a construction company, to which it passes the construction and output
risks. In some cases, the concessionaire chooses to allocate to the construction
contractor more tightened conditions, such as shortening the concession period or
increasing the penalties. According to Kriegler, the form of agreement between the
concessionaire and the construction contractor is usually a Design Build Agreement,
Figure 4 (Kriegler, 2006).

Shareholders

Lenders

Equity

Operating
Sub-Contractors

Debt

Project Company
Operating
Subcontracts

And Issuers

Design Build
Agreement

Construction
Contractor

Project
Agreement

Project off-taker

Figure 4: PPP Agreement Structure (Kriegler, 2006)

The concessionaire, or the private sector, is the key stone among the different
parties involved in a PPP project. Figure 4 shows the relationship between the private
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sector consortium and the government. It also shows the different components of the
consortium, as it includes fund sources such as debt sources, usually represented in the
bank, and equity sources, represented in the different investors. In addition, the
consortium should include a design and construction contractor. The type of contract in
this case is usually a design and build contract, as stated above. The consortium should
also include the operator, which usually starts acting before the end of the construction
phase and extends beyond the concession period and all the way up to the handover of
the facility back to the government (Department of Treasury and Finance, 2001).

3 . 1 . 2 The PPP Financial Model
The financial bid of the PPP project is different from conventional projects, as
it includes detailed calculations comprising all costs and revenues associated with the
PPP project. The financial model is usually done on a spreadsheet, such as Microsoft
Excel. According to the Public Private Partnership Handbook issued by the Asian
Development Bank, the private sector financial model's main purpose is to calculate all
the direct and indirect costs, contingencies, and profits in order to come up with the
service fees. The model includes assumptions, inputs, and outputs. Assumptions
include inflation rates, taxes, etc.; moreover, the modeler should input the capital
expenditure (Capex), the operating expense (Opex), equity and debt service data,
revenues based on forecasted demands or production rates, etc. The model also includes
calculations of the different financial statements of the SPV, including income
statement, cash-flow statement, profit and loss account, and the balance sheet. The
model also provides a group of financial indicators such as the Internal Rate of Return
(IRR), Return on Equity (ROE), Annual Debt Service Coverage Ratio (ADSCR), and
Loan Life Debt Service Cover Ratio (LLCR) (Public Private Partnership Handbook,
2008).
According to Turhani and Turhani in their paper entitled “Financial Model of a
PPP Project,” the importance of the bidders’ financial models is that they are compared
to shadow bid models prepared by the public sector to ensure the viability of the bids.
Further, the lenders usually require the private sector to submit the financial model in
order to ensure that the private sector will be able to meet the loan payment deadlines.
Moreover, the financial model is a very handy tool during the lifecycle of the project,
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as it is the only way to adjust the service fees to reflect changes in the contract, variation
orders, or refinance gains, if it is included in the contract conditions. It also can be used
while monitoring the project budget and to provide financial statements along the
lifecycle of the project (Turhani & Turhani, 2012).

3 . 2 Contract Renegotiation
3 . 2 . 1 Triggers of Renegotiation
Guasch and Straub, in their paper entitled “Renegotiation of Infrastructure
Concessions: An Overview,” stated that due to the length of PPP projects, renegotiation
is inevitable during the concession period; therefore, the renegotiation process should
be defined clearly and accounted for before awarding the PPP contract. Moreover,
renegotiation triggers should be defined carefully and drafted in the contract in order to
avoid unnecessary costs of unjustified renegotiation claims. The government can
misuse its power; on the other hand, the private sector may ask to renegotiate the
contract and obtain a better deal that may not be in favor of the users and may allow
monopoly behavior by the private sector. Hence, good contract design and regulatory
framework is necessary to regulate the incidence of renegotiating any concession
contract (Guasch & Straub, 2006).
Guasch and Straub published another article, entitled “Corruption and
Concession Renegotiations: Evidence from the Water and Transport Sectors in Latin
America,” in 2009. In their paper, Guasch and Straub discuss more than 300 PPP
contracts in Latin America, and are able to prove that the level of corruption in the
countries had a high impact on the number of contracts renegotiated. They summarized
the different factors that increase or decrease the probability of renegotiation. The
factors increasing the probability of renegotiation are corruption, many investment
obligations, very competitive environment, allocating most risks to the private sector,
lack of regulation enforcement, financial crisis, indulgent award requirements, and
awarding the project close to election dates. The factors decreasing the probability of
renegotiation are strong enforcement of the contract terms, gaining experience by
increasing the number of PPP projects in a country, and minimizing the income
guarantees (Guasch & Straub, 2009).
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Moreover, Garg, in his PhD dissertation entitled “Working the PPP:
Coordination of Public-Private Partnerships,” also proves that the degree of experience
of the different parties’ representatives greatly affects the level of coordination among
the different parties. This hugely influences the contract renegotiation possibilities, as
well. While designing the contract, the contract terms should try as much as possible to
account for any potential changes in the project. This ensures the flexibility of the
contract and makes it easier to renegotiate the contract in a later stage when the change
occurs. In cases where changes cannot be determined, a concept similar to cost plus
contracts can be used, or a provision may be added in the contract against such change,
provided that such cost plus value shall be reviewed by a committee of experts to ensure
that the private sector will not take advantage of this cost plus method and that the costs
are at the market prices (Garg, 2012).
In their paper entitled “Multidimensionality and Renegotiation: Evidence from
Transport-Sector Public-Private-Partnership Transactions in Latin America,” Estache
et al state that the likelihood of renegotiation depends on many variables that exist along
the lifecycle of PPPs, as early as the bidding stage. Renegotiation can be a result of
internal project factors, such as unforeseen risks, or external factors, such as changes in
the government policy. Renegotiation usually reflects an incomplete contract (Estache
et al, 2009).
According to De Brux in his paper entitled “The Dark and Bright Sides of
Renegotiation: An Application to Transport,” the incompleteness of PPP contracts costs
the public sector the burden of resorting to renegotiation. The complexity of
renegotiation is proportional to the size and complexity of the project and the length of
the concession period, as well. The more complex, bigger, and longer the project is, the
highest the probability of going through contract renegotiation (De Brux, 2010).
In their paper entitled “Balancing Contractual and Relational Approaches for
PPP Success and Sustainability,” Kumaraswamy, Anvuur, and Rahman study inflexible
contracts as one of the triggers of the PPP contract renegotiation. They propose a system
that combines both the traditional contracting protocols and what is called relational
contracting (RC), which is more flexible in terms of dealing with unforeseen conditions
and the risk that arises suddenly during the execution of the project (Kumaraswamy et
al, 2005).
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Silva, in his paper entitled “Toll Roads: Recent Trends in Private Participation,”
conducted a literature review to explain some lessons learned from some cases of failure
in Latin America. One of the cases was a toll road program that failed for several
reasons; the main among them is that the contract was not flexible enough to mitigate
all the construction and the operation risks. In other words, the contract gave more care
to the construction risks than the operation risks (Silva, 2000).
According to Garvin in his paper entitled “Governance of PPP Projects through
Contract Provisions,” one of the most important factors in the renegotiation process is
the mutual trust between the different parties, which leads eventually to sustainability.
The key aspect of this approach is sharing benefits and risks among the different parties
of the PPP through the contract agreement; however, some problems and unforeseen
risks may occur during the construction and the operation that have not been included
within the contract clauses. Garvin has studied different incentives mechanisms through
some contract clauses in order to make those clauses flexible to absorb any risks arising
after the commencement of the project and minimize the need for renegotiation (Garvin,
2009).
Dong, in his PhD dissertation entitled “Essays in Advanced Risk Management
and Quantitative Strategies in Infrastructure Finance,” used the concept of contract
flexibility, as well. In his dissertation, he incorporated the critical success factors
(CSFs) of PPP projects into a tool to help achieve economic efficiency of PPP projects
by using the concept of contract flexibility (Dong, 2010). Finally, clear and flexible
contract provisions, choosing a suitable payment mechanism, and providing
transparency along the project execution are good practices to encourage investors to
pursue the PPP path and minimize the probability of renegotiation.
According to the European Investment Bank (EIB), renegotiations that lead to
major changes in PPP contracts are banned by the European Union Laws; in addition,
it recommends that contracts are drafted in a way that minimizes the need for larger
renegotiation operations. Moreover, the EIB proposes using a “facilitator” to moderate
the renegotiation process in a fair and neutral way in order to guarantee its efficiency.
The bank states that the renegotiation process has many benefits for regaining the
equilibrium of the contract; however, most recorded renegotiation requests aim only for
unjustified gains, which should be forbidden (European Investment Bank, 2011).
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Roach also recommends, in his PhD dissertation entitled “Law and Politics in
Public Private Partnerships: Transparency, Conflict of Interest, and Renegotiation in
Concession Arrangements,” establishing an “independent auditor” within the public
sector to be responsible for all the PPP projects in the state or government. Roach
suggests that the independent auditor be formed by five members who have knowledge
and experience in the PPP field. The advantage of such an institution is to avoid
conflicts between the different governmental institutions involved in the PPP process
that may lead to the failure of PPP projects. Roach states that the auditor will prevent
any initiations of conflicts of interest and will help in the process of renegotiation in
general (Roach , 2011).
Other than the above recommendations, the contract designer of a PPP project
should apply some adjustments in order to ensure a well-defined path for the
renegotiation process to avoid unfavorable solutions, such as termination. Dewatripont
and Legros, in their paper entitled “Public-Private Partnerships: Contract Design and
Risk Transfer,” recommend that PPP contracts have a clear method of output indicators.
They also suggest a clear procedure to revise the different cost items and evaluate the
investments and assets of the project. Moreover, PPP contracts should include a clear
method of conflict resolution and early termination (Dewatripont & Legros, 2009).
Chan and Yu, in their paper entitled “Contract Strategy for Design Management
in the Design and Build System,” discussed the design and build projects with large
scales similar to PPP projects. Although the public sector procures the private sector to
do the design and construction work, the coordination between the designer and the
contractor is still a concern for the public sector. The paper focuses on the different
responsibilities in the design phase and how the design is coordinated between the
design consultant and the contractor. In addition, the researchers performed a survey to
determine the obligations of each party in the design stage and the ability of existing
contract terms to reflect these obligations. Chan and Yu introduce a set of rules to be
considered when drafting the contracts in order to avoid renegotiation (Chan & Yu,
2005).
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3 . 2 . 2 Frequency of Renegotiation
Renegotiation arises from a major change that is usually included within the
terms and conditions of the concession contract, such as a change in law, a change in
payment, a change in the concession period, or a change in technical standards. Changes
in tariffs due to inflation or periodic changes as per the contract are not considered to
be renegotiations.
In their paper entitled “Concessions of Infrastructure in Latin America:
Government-Led Renegotiation,” Guasch, Laffont and Straub present statistics
belonging from Latin America that renegotiation occurs in 74 percent of water and
sanitation concession contracts versus 55 percent in transportation concession
contracts; moreover, they are able to calculate an average of the time of renegotiation
from the contract award date, which was estimated to be 1.6 years in case of water and
sanitary projects versus 3.1 years in case of transportations projects. The above results
show a high frequency of renegotiation in concessions contracts, which raise the
question of the validity of the concession model and its efficiency. If bidders become
aware of their ability to easily renegotiate the concession, they would be inclined to
gain the concession at any price, then renegotiate the terms to obtain a better deal that
erases the benefits of a concession contract. Hence, Guasch et al recommend fixing a
renegotiation fee to be paid by the private sector in order to avoid unnecessary
renegotiation claims; however, such fees shall be refunded to the private sector in case
the renegotiation was in favor of the private sector (Guasch et al, 2007).
Moreover, contract renegotiation is more likely to occur in contracts awarded
through competitive bidding, while it is less likely to occur in bilateral negotiation
concession contracts, as bidders may be forced to lower their prices to unrealistic
margins to stay in competition. According to Marques and Berg in their paper entitled
“Revisiting the Strengths and Limitations of Regulatory Contracts in Infrastructure
Industries,” contracts which follow a price cap regime are subjected to renegotiation
more than contracts following the rate of return regime. In 60 percent of the cases, the
private sector is the initiator of the renegotiation. Table 2 explains the percentages of
renegotiated contracts with the combined effect of the type of regulation and the
initiator of the renegotiation. In case of the Price Cap Regime, the operator feels at risk;
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hence, this justifies the 83 percent of operators initiating the renegotiation process
(Marques & Berg, 2010).
Table 2: Percentage of Renegotiated Contracts (Marques & Berg, 2010)
Initiator of
Renegotiation

Both Government
and Operator

Government

Operator

Price Cap

11%

6%

83%

Rate of Return

39%

34%

26%

Hybrid Regime

30%

26%

44%

3 . 2 . 3 PPP Contract Renegotiation and the Re-equilibrium Model
Due to the long term nature of PPP projects, unforeseen conditions have a very
high probability of occurrence; hence, PPP contracts usually contain provisions for
contract renegotiation in order to enhance transparency and flexibility in the contract.
The private sector should have a very strong financial monitor and control policy in
order to identify the events that may lead to unbalancing the contract equilibrium.
The agreed upon financial model of a PPP project is used as a basis to create a
re-equilibrium model. The financial model provides a way for the different parties in
the PPP project to have common ground when forced to make some modifications to
the service fees. The importance of the re-equilibrium model comes from its
transparency, which makes it clear for all parties which parts have changed, as well as
the effect of such parts on the rest of the model.
The private sector, the public sector, or both may call for contract renegotiation
upon realizing a change in the financial model equilibrium. In PPP contracts, the party
responsible for preparing the re-equilibrium sheet whenever a risk materializes and
defining responsibilities of events is called the Independent Financial Expert, which is
a third party. Whenever a risk arises, the Independent Financial Expert calculates the
impact of such risk on the different elements of the base financial model. The change
can be in the assumptions or the inputs of the base financial model components. Then,
the Independent Financial Expert develops the re-equilibrium sheet, which usually has
a number of options to keep the financial model balanced and ensure that the private
sector is getting the contractual internal rate of return (IRR). The common three
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scenarios that the re-equilibrium sheet has are: increasing the service charges,
increasing the concession period, paying a lump sum amount to the private sector, or a
combination of any of the above in order to maintain the original IRR constant.

3 . 2 . 4 Results of Renegotiation
The output of the renegotiation process is usually a change to the financial
model, which reflects a number of possibilities, such as a change to the service charge
rate, a change to one or more of the different cost items, a change to the concession
period, etc.
Ho, in his paper entitled “Model for Financial Renegotiation in Public Private
Partnership Projects and Its Policy Implications: Game Theoretic View,” develops a
dynamic game model, which means that the decision makers in the model make their
decisions in sequence; in other words, the government knows the decision of the private
sector before making their new decision, and vice versa. A game theory model is a term
describing “the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between
intelligent rational decision-makers” (Myerson, 1991). The aim of Ho’s model is to
help the public sector in developing new policies and regulations to avoid the
opportunistic behavior of the private sector bidders by comparing the political cost of
re-tendering the project versus the political cost of renegotiation (Ho, 2006).
When discussing the results of the renegotiation process, the question shall
always be whether to accept or reject the renegotiation claim. Ho, in his paper entitled
“Government Policy on PPP Financial Issues: Bid Compensation and Financial
Renegotiation,” has developed a model to answer this question. Ho recommends
avoiding renegotiation as much as possible, as it usually favors the private sector and
may harm the competitive nature of the bidding process. Ho develops a gametheoretical model for the financial renegotiation process (Ho, 2009).
In the below table, Guasch, Laffont, and Straub demonstrate the percentage of
negotiated contracts with a certain renegotiation outcome. As shown in Table 3, 69
percent of the renegotiated contracts in the selected sample agreed to delay the targets
of the investment obligations of the private sector (Guasch et al, 2007).
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Table 3: Renegotiation Outcomes (Guasch L., 2004)
Renegotiation Outcome
Delays on investment obligations targets
Acceleration of investment obligations

%
Renegotiated
Contracts
69%
18%

Tariff Increases
Tariff Decreases

62%
19%

Increase in the number of cost component which increase tariff
Extension in the Concession Period

59%
38%

Increase Annual fees paid by the Operator
Decrease Annual fees paid by the Operator

17%
31%

Xu et al developed a pricing model to calculate the price of PPP contracts both
before and after renegotiation in their paper entitled, “Developing a Concession Pricing
Model for PPP Highway Projects.” They generated a simplified equation to calculate
the concession price present value based on the in and out cash flows, considering the
construction and operation costs, the loan repayment, taxes, and revenues. Equation 1

Equation 1: PPP Pricing Equation (Xu et al, 2012)
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shows the steps of calculating the concession price by considering the financial
elements and price parameters of PPP. Xu et al developed a price adjustment
mechanism in order to account for unforeseen risks and fluctuation in inflation and
interest rates in the original pricing equation. Equation 2 shows the different PPP risks
and their effect on the pricing equation (Xu et al, 2012).

Equation 2: The Effect of PPP Risks on the Pricing Equation (Xu et al, 2012)

3 . 3 Tools to Facilitate the Renegotiation Process
3 . 3 . 1 Decision Support Systems (DSS)
Decision Support Systems (DSS) are tools to choose from a set of alternatives.
DSS can be very helpful in assisting the choice among the different re-equilibrium
scenarios of the PPP financial model. Such tools can facilitate the PPP contract
renegotiation process. In their paper entitled “Developing a Theory of Construction
Problem Solving,” Li and Love conclude that Decision Support Systems can be
developed to deal with complex decisions (Li & Love, 1998).
In their paper entitled “Management Information Systems,” Sousa and Oz state
that Decision Support Systems (DSS) usually contain three modules: “Data
Management Module,” “Model Management Module,” and “Dialog Module;”
moreover, in some cases, it also contains “Sensitivity Analysis Module.” The Data
Management Module is where the database is; in other words, it contains all the relevant
data that will be used in the decision making process. The Model Management Module
can be a fixed or dynamic module, in which the output can depend on fixed data, or it
can change with the change of data. Another name of the Dialog Module is the user
interface, where this is the part of the model with which the user will be dealing. The
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Sensitivity Analysis module is the module measuring the effect of certain inputs on the
outputs of the model (Sousa & Oz, 2014). Decision Support Systems (DSS) are systems
developed to imitate experts; they can be used in many applications, such as making
choices, consulting, teaching, training, diagnosing, repairing, predicting, and
monitoring and control (Turban & Watson, 1994).
In this research, the alternatives to be chosen from are the outputs of the
renegotiation process, which are increasing the service charges, increasing the
concession period, or paying a lump sum amount to the private sector. The limitation
of the decision is to maintain the contractual internal rate of return (IRR) constant. The
factors affecting such a decision are different and vary according to whether they are
associated with the private sector or the public sector. As stated in the problem
statement section, the public and the private sectors usually have different interests
when it comes to renegotiation. The private sector is seeking profits, while the public
sector is seeking public demands. Hence, DSS will serve in making sure that the
interests of both parties are considered in the decision making process.

3 . 3 . 2 Applications of DSS in PPP
Ghavamifar, in his PhD dissertation entitled “A Decision Support System for
Project Delivery Method Selection in the Transit Industry,” developed a Decision
Support System that helped the public sector in the selection process of a suitable
delivery method for the transit projects. Ghavamifar included many parameters in his
model, such as financial issues, including the value for money (VFM) aspect and the
public sector comparator (PSC) in case of PPP delivery method. By choosing the most
suitable delivery method, projects were more likely to attain their goals in efficient
ways. One of the main advantages of Ghavamifar’s model is that it was a tool which
provides a fair comparison between PPP and conventional delivery methods despite the
many differences between them (Ghavamifar, 2009).
Gross, in her PhD dissertation entitled “Aligning Public-Private Partnership
Contracts with Public Objectives for Transportation Infrastructure,” developed
Decision Support Systems for determining the key features of PPP contracts, such as
the length of the concession period, the payment mechanism, and the risk mitigation
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techniques. Gross studied a database of eighteen PPP projects in the United States and
other countries by using a new method called “Qualitative Comparative Analysis
(QCA)” in order to assess qualitative data quantitatively. The criteria of selection
included reaching a specific unit rate, minimizing government subsidies, and increasing
revenues (Gross, 2010).
Kassab, in his PhD dissertation entitled “Integrated Decision Support System
for Infrastructure Privatization under Uncertainty Using Conflict Resolution,”
developed a Decision Support System to choose a suitable PPP type for an
infrastructure project. PPPs have many types that can suit the different parties’ interests.
This model helps in reducing conflict by being able to choose a module that fits all
parties, minimizing the probability of conflict. It also minimizes cost and time wasted
in those conflicts. Moreover, Kassab’s model is adjusted to suit environments with high
levels of uncertainty (Kassab, 2006).
Finally, Jin, in his paper entitled “Neurofuzzy Decision Support System for
Efﬁcient Risk Allocation in Public-Private Partnership Infrastructure Projects,”
developed a Decision Support System with the aid of artificial intelligence tools to
predict the optimum allocation of risks in infrastructure PPP projects. The model proved
to give precise and effective results (Jin, 2010).

3 . 4 Originality of Research
This research develops a framework in order to support and facilitate the PPP
contract renegotiation process. As shown in previous research, the contract
renegotiation process is very frequent in the case of PPP projects. The tool developed
consists of a Decision Support System in order to enable the model developed to deal
with choosing a renegotiation re-equilibrium scenario suitable for both the public and
the private sectors. This has never been attempted in previous research. The Decision
Support System will not only provide a way to choose among the different reequilibrium scenarios, but it will also provide a tool to calculate the different scenarios.
The Decision Support System is a user-friendly tool which helps non-expert users
through the decision making process. The model shall also provide the user with
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strategic decision making reports and sensitivity analysis. This model is considered
interdisciplinary research, as it combines civil engineering and management sciences.
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CHAPTER 4 : RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
4 . 1 Framework Development
The purpose of this research is to facilitate the PPP renegotiation process,
starting from specifying the events leading to renegotiation, moving to formulating the
re-equilibrium scenarios, and finally choosing the optimum scenario to satisfy all
parties. Stakeholders have different interests and concerns in the renegotiation process;
hence, the proposed model will work on finding common ground between all parties in
order to reach an optimum renegotiation outcome. This will ensure a fair approach and
enhance mutual trust between the stakeholders, which will benefit the project’s overall
progress.
The following framework is to be of great benefit to decision makers in the
public and the private sectors, yet the objective of the proposed framework is not to be
a substitute for decision makers. During renegotiation, the only way to benefit the
project is to make sure that all parties are compensated justly so that they can fulfill
their obligations under the contract agreement; in other words, if the investors are not
getting a sufficient rate of return, the project will not function properly, which will
eventually harm the interests of the client.
In order to achieve the thesis objective, a framework is developed in order to
facilitate the PPP contract renegotiation process. The framework consists of eight
modules: a User-Interface Module, a Risk Allocation Module, a PPP Valuation Module,
a Financial Model Re-equilibrium Module, a Scenarios Development Module, a
Scenarios Selection Module, a Reports Module and a Sensitivity Analysis Module,
Figure 5. The user-interface module interacts with all the other seven modules as it
provides inputs and receives outputs from all of them. The risk allocation module
presents the risk matrix of the project and the risks allocated to the private sector, the
public sector, or shared between them. It also shows the impact of the risks on the
different cost parameters. The PPP valuation module defines the present value of the
concession, while the financial model re-equilibrium module defines the adjusted
present value due to an event or a group of events resulting in the destruction of the
balance of the financial model equilibrium. Then, the scenarios development module
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User-Interface Module

Risk Allocation Module
PPP Valuation Module
Financial Model Re-equilibrium Module
Scenario Development Module
Scenario Selection Module
Reports Module
Sensitivity Analysis Module

Figure 5: Proposed Framework Modules
calculates the different scenarios to return to the contract equilibrium. The scenarios
selection module helps to provide a clear method of selection among the different
scenarios. Finally, the reports module and the sensitivity analysis module provide the
decision maker with a user friendly version of the results and analysis in order to help
him in the decision making process.

4 . 2 Prototype DSS Model
A prototype Decision Support System model is developed to reflect the
proposed framework. The model is constructed by using a number of computer-aided
programs including Microsoft Excel 2013, Visual Basic for Applications (VBA)
programming language, and the Precision Tree 5.5 for Excel add-in. Moreover, the
Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) programming language helped in making the
user-interface module simpler, more user-friendly, and more adaptive to the user’s
requirements. This model is considered to be a multi-user system in which both the
public sector and the private sector interact with the user-interface consecutively.
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Moreover, the Precision Tree 5.5 for Excel add-in tool provided a more vivid
presentation of the process of selecting the best scenarios for the public sector, the
private sector, and both of them. It also provided a number of reports and the
sensitivities of the different inputs.
As stated in the previous section, the framework has eight modules: a userinterface module, a risk allocation module, a PPP valuation module, a financial model
re-equilibrium module, a scenarios development module, a scenarios selection module,
a reports module and a sensitivity analysis module. Each of the above modules has a
number of sub-modules, as shown in Figure 6. The user-interface module has the

User-Interface Module

Scenarios Selection Module

Project General Information
Risk Matrix
Risk Allocation Information
Risk Impact
Initial Payment Information
Updated Payment Information
Scenario Selection Criteria
Criteria Importance
Criteria Ranking

Scenario Selection Criteria
Criteria Weights Calculations
Weighted Sum Model
Best Scenario Calculations
Private Sector Decision Tree and EMV
Public Sector Decision Tree and EMV
Combined Decision Tree and EMV

Risk Allocation Module

Reports Module

Risk Allocation Tables

Risk Allocation Charts
PPP Initial Value
PPP Updated Value
Re-equilibrium Scenarios
Private Sector Best Scenario
Public Sector Best Scenario
Combined Best Scenario
Probability Chart Report
Cumulative Chart Report
Statistical Summary Report
Decision Table Report
Optimal Tree Report
Policy Suggestion Report

PPP Valuation Module
Initial Payment Distribution
PPP Value Calculations

FM Re-equilibrium Module
Updated Payment Distribution
PPP Updated Value Calculations

Scenarios Development Module

Sensitivity Analysis Module

Re-equilibrium Scenarios Calculations

Selection Criteria Sensitivity Analysis

Figure 6: The Framework Sub-modules
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project general information, risk matrix, risk allocation information, risk impact, initial
payment information, updated payment information, scenario selection criteria, criteria
importance, and criteria ranking. In addition, the risk allocation module has the risk
allocation tables. Moreover, the PPP valuation module has the initial payment
distribution and the PPP value calculations. The scenarios development module has the
re-equilibrium scenarios calculations, while the scenarios selection module has the
scenario selection criteria, the criteria weights calculations, the weighted sum model,
the best scenario calculations, the private sector decision tree, and the expected
monetary value (EMV), the public sector decision tree and the expected monetary
value, as well as the combined decision tree and the expected monetary value. Finally,
the reports module has the risk allocation charts, the PPP initial value, the PPP updated
value, the re-equilibrium scenarios, the private sector best scenario, public sector best
scenario, the combined best scenario, the probability chart report, the cumulative chart
report, the statistical summary report, the decision table report, the optimal tree report,
and the policy suggestion report, and the sensitivity analysis module has the selection
criteria sensitivity analysis.

4 . 2 . 1 The User-Interface Module
The user-interface module networks with all the other modules; the relationship
between the user-interface module and the other modules is shown in Figure 7. This
module's function is to provide inputs to the risk allocation module, the PPP valuation
module, the financial model re-equilibrium module, the scenarios development module,
and the scenarios selection module based on an interactive dialogue among those
different modules and the user-interface module. Then, it receives the results and
analysis from the reports module and the sensitivity analysis module. There exists a
continuous interaction between this module and the other modules along the
framework. The input process is dynamic, as it depends on sending and receiving
information along the modules of the prototype model. A set of inputs is entered, and,
based on the obtained results from a specific module, the following set of inputs become
ready to be entered.
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Figure 7: Modules Interrelation

The first set of inputs includes the project name, the PPP contract type, the
payment mechanism, the payment amount, and the payment intervals. It also contains
some information with regard to the risk allocation module about the risks profile of
the project, including all possible risks, their allocations, and their expected impacts on
the project valuation process. The framework provides both options of having a
standardized risk sheet and an inputted one. The risk sheet contains the PPP risks, and
their preferred allocations and expected impacts on the valuation process.
Then, the user is asked to enter the second set of inputs: some information
regarding the PPP valuation module, such as the initial payment distribution of the
project, like the capital expenditure distribution along the lifecycle of the project, and
other costs and revenues as well. The third set of inputs are for the financial model reequilibrium module, such as the main reasons for the re-equilibrium of the contract and
the corresponding risks and their allocation. It also includes the updated payment
distributions.
The above inputs are used in the scenarios development module in order to
obtain the three common re-equilibrium scenarios: increasing the service charges,
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increasing the concession period, or paying a lump sum amount to the private sector.
Then, the user-interface module presents those three scenarios in order to choose a
combination for a fourth scenario (i.e., the fourth scenario shall be an increase in the
concession period and a payment of a lump sum amount to the private sector). The
scenarios development module then uses those inputs to provide the final four
scenarios, moving to the scenarios selection module to pick the best scenario that would
maximize the satisfaction of both parties.
This comes by another set of inputs representing the criteria of scenarios
selection, their weights, and importance with respect to the four scenarios, and the
ranking of the sub-criteria, based upon which the public sector and the private sector
choose their best scenarios. Finally, the results are analyzed and reported via the reports
module and the sensitivity analysis module back to the user-interface module.

4 . 2 . 2 The Risk Allocation Module
The risk allocation process is a very important process in construction projects,
and it is even more important when dealing with long-term PPP projects. The
significance of risk allocation is clear during the renegotiation process. As stated in the
literature, the government shall only compensate the private sector for the portions of
the risks that are allocated to the public sector; hence, a clear definition of risk allocation
should exist in the PPP contract and be included in this proposed framework.
Figure 8 shows the relationship between the risk allocation module and the other
related modules. As shown in the figure, the inputs of the risk allocation module come
from the user-interface module, while the outputs of the risk allocation module are
heading for the PPP valuation module, the financial model re-equilibrium module, and
the reports module.
In the proposed framework, there are two options for obtaining the risk
allocation percentages of the public sector and the private sector. The first option is the
user-interface module via inputting the actual values of the risks allocation stated in the
PPP contract, which is the ideal choice.
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Figure 8: The Risk Allocation Module Interrelation with the Other Modules

On the other hand, the risk allocation percentages can be obtained from a
redefined risk allocation matrix, which is based on a survey conducted by Badran in her
thesis entitled “Risk Analysis and Contract Management for Public Private Partnership
Projects in Egypt.” The predefined risk allocation percentages are shown in Table 4
(Badran, 2013). The risks were categorized into three groups: country risks, sector risks,
and project risks. This is not the optimal choice, as it will not reflect the exact risk
allocation percentages in the PPP contract; however, this option can be used when doing
a quick check, or when the re-equilibrium value is already agreed upon and there is no
need to look into the responsibilities and risk allocations in detail. In general, Table 4
presents the three main categories and the different PPP risks with their percentage
allocations and the party to which it is allocated.
The risk allocation module also includes a section that studies the effect of
certain risk occurrences on the different parts of the PPP valuation process. This will
not only affect the PPP valuation process, but will also affect the financial model reequilibrium module. Risks are the main triggers of renegotiation, which means that the
events leading to renegotiation should be studied thoroughly and assigned to their
corresponding risks in order to define the bearer of such risk. The financial model re54

equilibrium module shall only account for a portion of the risks that are allocated to the
public sector. Finally, the results are reported via the reports module.
Table 4: Qualitative and Quantitative PPP Risks Allocation (Badran, 2013)
#

Risk Factor

1
2
3

Country Risks:
Interest Rate Fluctuation
Inflation
Foreign exchange fluctuation

Private Public Both
(%)
(%)
(%)

Risk
Allocation

32
24
36

12
20
16

56
56
48

20
28
56
60

28
8
16
12

52
64
28
28

8
9

Public Credit
Political Risk
Nationalization/expropriation
Government corruption
Sector Risks:
Price Change
Revenue Risk

40
36

8
24

52
40

10
11
12
13

Market competition
Supply and demand
Change in Market demand
Legislation changes

36
24
12
32

12
16
24
20

52
60
64
48

14 Change in tax regulation

36

20

44

15
16
17
18

24
12
20
44

16
24
16
8

60
64
64
48

19 Government Intervention

40

16

44

20 Poor public decision making
process
21 Inadequate law and supervision
system
22 Lack of supporting infrastructure
Project Risks:
23 Operation cost overrun
24 Inability of concessionaire
25 Subjective Project evaluation
method
26 Insufficient project finance
supervision

36

24

40

36

32

32

12

20

68

Both
Project
Dependent
Both
Both
Both
Project
Dependent
Project
Dependent
Both
Both
Both
Project
Dependent
Project
Dependent
Project
Dependent
Project
Dependent
Both

76
36
24

0
8
12

24
56
64

Private
Both
Both

44

4

52

Both

4
5
6
7

Government policy
Political/Public opposition
Swings in Public Opinion
Regulatory/Contractual Risk
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Both
Both
Project
Dependent
Both
Both
Private
Private

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Performance Security Risk
Permits Risks
Delay in project approvals/permits
Dispute resolution
Imperfect contract documents
Deficiency of design
Quality Assurance
Quality Control
Latent Defect Risk
Project/operation changes
Inability of concessionaire
Provision of transformers,
substations or backup power
Construction Risk
Organization risk
Coordination risks
Land acquisition
Physical Obstacles that cannot be
avoided
Maintenance Risks
Access and delivery of site

56
20
20
28
20
32
36
32
52
52
32
38

4
8
16
0
16
12
8
8
0
8
8
8

40
72
64
72
64
56
56
60
48
40
60
56

Private
Both
Both
Both
Both
Both
Both
Both
Private
Private
Both
Both

76
64
44
22
28

0
0
4
32
20

24
36
52
56
52

Private
Private
Both
Both
Both

60
32

12
20

28
48

46 Connection of Public utilities to
boundaries of site
47 Connection to boundary of Site of
telephone lines and natural gas
provision
48 Labor unavailability
49 Material shortage
50 Third party delay/violation
51 Planning risks
52 Supervision, organization and
control for inspection of
Construction works
53 Technological Risks
54 Completion risk

20

36

44

24

44

32

Private
Project
Dependent
Project
Dependent
Project
Dependent

72
72
56
52
68

4
4
0
12
4

24
24
44
36
28

Private
Private
Private
Private
Private

60
48

12
4

28
48

55 Sustainability Risk

24

32

44

56 Antiquities Risks

20

36

44

57 Unforeseen Weather conditions
58 Unforeseen geotechnical conditions
59 Force majeure

56
52
20

4
8
0

40
40
80

Private
Project
Dependent
Project
Dependent
Project
Dependent
Private
Private
Both

39
40
41
42
43
44
45

56

4 . 2 . 3 The PPP Valuation Module
The PPP valuation process is a very long and tedious process. In general, PPP
project valuation is done through a financial model that incorporates all direct and
indirect costs of the project; it also includes the revenues and contingencies. The
purpose of the financial model is to come up with the service charge and the internal
rate of return (IRR) of the project. The financial model also provides different forms of
financial statements, such as the income statement, the cash-flow statement, and the
balance sheet. Moreover, it calculates some financial ratios to help in evaluating the
financial standing of the SPV. The financial model is quite important as it is considered
the basis of any adjustments through the lifecycle of the PPP contract.
Xu et al developed a pricing equation that is used in the valuation process in
their paper entitled “Developing a Concession Pricing Model for PPP Highway
Projects.” Equation 1 is developed by Xu et al to calculate the PPP highway project
price (Xu et al, 2012). In this framework, Equation 1 is edited to suit all types of PPP
projects. Some symbols are changed for the ease of notation as shown in Equation 3.
The PPP price at a certain point in time is the summation all the cash in and cash out
flows of the project. The equation considers only the items that will have as significant
effect on the PPP value and ignores minor items.
The cash in items are the operation income (OI) and the government subsidies
(GS), while the cash out items are the capital expenditure (Capex), the loan principle
(LP), the loan interest, which is the loan balance (LB) multiplied by the loan interest
(Li), the operation cost (Opex), and taxes (T). All the above costs and revenues are
discounted at a fixed interest rate (i) to get the present value of the PPP concession at
time (t). The value of the PPP concession can be determined at any time along the
construction period (T0) or the concession period (TC).
In this framework, a benchmark is taken at the beginning of the construction
period to calculate the PPP value. The above terms are adjusted to account for inflation
as per the PPP contract terms. Finally, the internal rate of return (IRR) is calculated for
the free cash flow by equating Equation 3 to zero and solving for the interest rate, which
will be the IRR.
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Equation 3: PPP Valuation Equation

Figure 9 shows the relationship between the PPP valuation module and the other
modules. The inputs of the PPP valuation module are taken from the user-interface
module and the risk allocation module. The outputs of the PPP valuation module are
used in the scenarios development module and the reports module.
The inputs coming from the user-interface module are the start and end dates of
the project, the concession period, the contractual construction period, the interest rate
that will be used to discount the different cash flows, the base inflation rate used in the
contract, as well as the initial distribution along the lifecycle of the project of the capital
expenditure distribution (Capex), the operation income distribution (OI), the
government subsidies distribution (GS), the loan principle distribution (LP), the loan
balance distribution (LB), the loan interest (Li), the operation cost distribution (Opex),
taxes distribution (T) and the output quantity distribution (Q). The above distributions
should be identical to the ones in the base financial model of the PPP concession to
reflect the same internal rate of return in the contract. Moreover, the risk allocation
module will also affect the PPP valuation module by affecting the cost of contingency
added to the above equation.
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Figure 9: The PPP Valuation Module Interrelation with the Other Modules

The scenarios development module uses the base concession value in its
calculations of the different re-equilibrium scenarios, as will be explained later in this
chapter. Finally, the PPP valuation module results will be reported via the reports
module.

4 . 2 . 4 The Financial Model Re-equilibrium Module
During the lifecycle of a PPP, which tends to be very lengthy compared to
conventional procurement methods, many events may arise that result in the need for
re-equilibrium or contract renegotiation, such as variation orders, unforeseen risks, or
refinancing gains. The only way to reflect those changes on the PPP value is by
constructing a re-equilibrium model similar to the financial model but adding the cost
and time impact of those events.
Figure 10 shows the financial model re-equilibrium module’s relationship with
the rest of the framework modules. The financial model re-equilibrium module is
similar to the PPP valuation module as it gets its inputs from the user-interface module
and the risk allocation module, and the outputs go to the scenarios development module
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and the reports module, as well. However, the inputs of the PPP valuation module are
different than the ones for the financial model re-equilibrium module. For instance, the
concession period (TC) is not an input, as it cannot be changed before agreeing on
choosing the scenario that corresponds to adjusting the concession period. Moreover,
the interest rate (i) remains constant in order to compare the present value obtained from
the PPP valuation model to the present value obtained from the financial model reequilibrium module.

UserInterface
Module

Scenario
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Financial
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Module

Risk
Allocation
Module

Reports
Module

Figure 10: The Financial Model Re-equilibrium Module Interrelation with
the Other Modules
The inputs coming from the user-interface module are the actual start and actual
end dates of the project, the re-equilibrium date (RD) that the scenarios are calculated
with reference to, the actual construction period (T0), the actual inflation rate, and the
updated distribution along the lifecycle of the project of the capital expenditure
distribution (Capex), the operation income distribution (OI), the government subsidies
distribution (GS), the loan principle distribution (LP), the loan balance distribution
(LB), the loan interest (Li), the operation cost distribution (Opex), taxes distribution
(T), and the output quantity distribution (Q). However, this updated distribution shall
reflect the impact of the events that led to renegotiation of the contract. This is the role
of the risk allocation module, as it is important to note that the updated distributions
shall only include the portion of the risks allocated to the public sector, for the public
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sector has already waived the other risk portions to the private sector as per the PPP
concession contract. Equation 3 shall be used again but with the updated values rather
than the base values to determine the updated concession value. Then, Equation 3 is
equated to zero in order to obtain the updated rate of return (IRR) that reflects those
changes. Finally, the outputs of the financial model re-equilibrium module are used in
the scenarios development module and reported in the reports module, as will be
explained later in the chapter.

4 . 2 . 5 The Scenarios Development Module
In order to gain the financial model re-equilibrium back, certain actions should
be taken. The commonly used re-equilibrium scenarios in PPP are paying a lump sum
amount to the private sector, increasing the service charges, increasing the concession
period, or a combination of the one or more of the above. The sole aim of the
renegotiation process is to maintain the investors’ initial IRR constant. Figure 11
illustrates the relationship between the scenarios development module and the other
modules. The scenarios development module inputs come from the user-interface
module, the PPP valuation module, and the financial model re-equilibrium module,
while the outputs go to the scenarios selection module and the reports module.

UserInterface
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Module

Scenarios
Development
Module

Financial
Model Reequilibrium
Module

Reports
Module

Figure 11: The Scenarios Development Module Interrelation with the Other
Modules
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The inputs coming from the PPP valuation module and the financial model reequilibrium module are the present value of the PPP concession value and the PPP
updated concession value at the start date of the PPP project, respectively. The
difference between the present value of the PPP concession value and the PPP updated
concession value is the re-equilibrium payment that is the basis for the different
scenarios development process.
In case of positive re-equilibrium payment, it means that the public sector shall
compensate the private sector. The opposite is also true. In case of a negative reequilibrium payment, it means that the private sector shall compensate the public sector.
Furthermore, in the case of a negative re-equilibrium payment, three scenarios of the
four scenarios shall actually not be applicable: paying a lump sum amount to the public
sector; decreasing the concession period; and the fourth scenario which is the
combination between the other scenarios. This is because the payment of a lump sum
amount from the private sector to the public sector shall distort the private sector cash
flow. Decreasing the concession period is not allowed due to the obligations the private
sector may have towards third parties until the end of the concession period. Moreover,
in PPP projects where the private sector is directly paid by the service users, the fourth
scenario which is decreasing the PPP payment may also not be applicable. For example,
in the case of transportation projects, the private sector cannot decrease the toll, as it
will create a market distortion.
The re-equilibrium date (RD) is considered the base date of the calculations of
the different scenarios. The first re-equilibrium scenario is to pay a lump sum amount
to the private sector. The re-equilibrium date (RD) is considered the date upon which
the lump sum payment shall be made. Hence, in order to calculate the required lump
sum payment, the future value of the difference between the present value of the PPP
concession value and the PPP updated concession value is obtained at the reequilibrium date using Equation 4, where, in this case, (FV) is the lump sum payment,
(PV) is the difference between the present value of the PPP concession value and the
PPP updated concession value at the beginning of the project, (i) is the fixed discount
rate, and (N) is the number of periods between the start date of the project and the reequilibrium date.
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Equation 4: Future Value given Present Value

The second re-equilibrium scenario is to increase the service charges. This
scenario depends on the nature of the payment in the contract. The user-interface
module supplies this module with the payment mechanism used (user charges, usage
payments, or availability payments), the amount of the periodic payment, and the
frequency of payment (i.e., annually, semi-annually, quarterly, etc.). The adjusted value
of the service charge is obtained using Equation 5, where the (A) is the adjusted amount,
(PV) is the lump sum payment at the re-equilibrium date obtained in the first scenario,
(i) in this case is the fixed discount rate divided by the number of periods in one year
in order to get the effective discount rate, and (N) is the number of periods, which equals
the number of periods from the re-equilibrium date until the end date of the project.
Finally, the adjusted amount is then added to the original payment amount to be the
adjusted periodic payment, which is to be paid starting from the re-equilibrium date
until the end of the concession period.

Equation 5: Annuity given Present Value

The third re-equilibrium scenario is to increase the concession period. This is
done through a number of steps. The first step is to calculate the future value of the
difference between the present value of the PPP concession value and the PPP updated
concession value at the end date of the project using Equation 4, where, in this case,
(FV) is the required payment at the end date of the project, (PV) is the difference
between the present value of the PPP concession value and the PPP updated concession
value at the start date of the project, (i) is the fixed discount rate, and (N) is the number
of years of the concession period. The second step is to get the required number of
periods after the concession period for this amount to be paid with an extension of the
service payment. This is done by using Equation 5, where the (A) is the project initial
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service charge, (PV) is future value calculated in the previous step, (i) in this case is the
fixed discount rate divided by the number of payments in one year in order to get the
effective discount rate, and (N) is the additional number of periods required to reach reequilibrium after the end date of the project. Finally, the additional number of periods
are added to the original concession period in order to obtain the adjusted concession
period.
The fourth scenario is a combination of any two of the above scenarios. The
user-interface module provides the exact combination required for the fourth scenario
after getting the reports for the three scenarios. This is to allow the framework to avoid
breaking the maximum values required of the above scenarios. For instance, there can
be a maximum number of years that the concession period cannot exceed. In order to
add this limitation to the framework, the user-interface module shall provide the
scenarios development module with a combination for the fourth scenario, which
includes the increase of concession period scenario. This input shall be limited to fix
the concession period to a value between the original concession period and a maximum
value defined by the user-interface module. This process serves to exclude the
unwanted or unfeasible re-equilibrium scenarios. Finally, the outputs of this module,
which are the three scenarios report and the final scenarios report, will be used in the
scenarios selection module and the reports module.

4 . 2 . 6 The Scenarios Selection Module
In the scenarios development module, four re-equilibrium scenarios are
originated: paying a lump sum amount to the private sector, increasing the service
charges, increasing the concession period, or a combination of one or more of the above.
The scenarios selection module is the module in which the choice between the four reequilibrium scenarios is made. Figure 12 shows the relationship between the scenarios
selection module and the other modules. The inputs of the scenarios selection module
are from the user-interface module and the scenarios development module. The outputs
of the module go to the reports module and the sensitivity analysis module. The goal of
the scenarios selection module is to account for the interests of the stakeholders of the
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PPP project, mainly the public sector and the private sector, when selecting the
renegotiation outcome scenario.
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Reports
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Scenarios
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Figure 12: The Scenarios Selection Module Interrelation with the Other
Modules

The scenarios development module provides the scenarios selection module
with the final four re-equilibrium scenarios, while the user-interface module supplies
this module with the criteria and their corresponding sub-criteria, based on which the
selection is to be made. In order to evaluate each scenario, a score shall be given to each
scenario. The scenario score is calculated using the weighted sum model. This model
suggests that each scenario to have a set of criteria which have a relative importance to
each other. The scenario score shall equal the summation of the weight of importance
for each criteria multiplied by its value as shown in Equation 6. (x) is the number of
alternatives of scenarios, (i) is the number of main criteria, (j) is the number of subcriteria of a certain main criteria, (W) is the weights and (R) is the rankings.

Equation 6: Scenario Score
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After inputting the criteria, the user-interface provides the scenarios selection
module with the importance of each criteria with respect to the rest of the criteria for
each of the four scenarios. Moreover, it also supply the scenarios selection module with
the importance of sub-criteria with respect to the rest of the sub-criteria of the same
category for each of the four scenarios. Then, the scenarios selection module determines
the weights of the criteria and sub-criteria with respect to the different re-equilibrium
scenarios. The approach is to draw matrices for the main criteria and each of the subcriteria categories in which the top row is the criteria or the sub-criteria and the rest of
the matrix is a mirror image. Decision matrices were invented by Stuart Pugh (Pugh,
1991). An example of the decision matrix is shown in Figure 13. The importance of the
criteria with relative to the other criteria is taken from the user-interface module and
inserted in the respective position in the matrix. In order to obtain the weight of each
criteria, the number of occurrences of each criteria is counted, and the weights are
calculated by dividing the number of occurrences of each criteria over the total number
of occurrences of all of them. It is important to note that the total number of weights of
the criteria or a certain sub-criteria of one category should equal to one.

Figure 13: Scenario Selection Criteria Decision Matrix (Pugh, 1991)

The above exercise is done for the criteria and the sub-criteria for each one of
the four scenarios, as the weights may differ when dealing with making a lump sum
payment or just extending the concession period. After obtaining the weights of the
criteria, rankings are taken via the user-interface module. Separate rankings are required
from both the public sector and the private sector in order to reflect their interests and
preferences. Using the weighted sum model, eight scenario scores are calculated: four
for the four re-equilibrium scenarios from the perspective of the public sector, and the
other four for the four re-equilibrium scenarios from the perspective of the private
sector. The outputs of this step are the best scenarios or the scenarios with the highest
scores from the public sector perspective and the public sector perspective. Then,
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averages of the private sector rankings and the public sector rankings are taken to
calculate the four re-equilibrium scenarios scores from the perspective of both parties.
The scenario with the highest score is marked to be the best scenario from the
perspective of both prospective.

4 . 2 . 7 The Reports Module
The reports module is the module in which all the results of the previous
modules are combined and processed in order to be directed to the user-interface
module. The reports module allows the decision maker to look at the broader picture
rather than looking at detailed calculations. Figure 14 illustrates the relationship
between the reports module and the other modules of the framework.
The reports module provides risk allocation charts showing the portions of the
risks allocated to the public sector, the portions of the risks allocated to the private
sector, and the portions of the risks shared between the both. The reports module also
provides the user-interface module with a report showing the original PPP concession
value versus the PPP updated concession value. In addition, the reports module presents
the four re-equilibrium scenarios: paying a lump sum amount to the private sector
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Figure 14: The Reports Module Interrelation with the Other Modules
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scenario, increasing the service charges scenario, increasing the concession period
scenario, and a combination of any two of the above scenarios. Then, the reports module
presents the best scenario from the perspective of the public sector, followed by the best
scenario from the perspective of the private sector, and finally the best scenario from
the perspective of both.
The following reports are three decision tree reports, each presenting the
expected monetary value (EMV), which is another way of calculating the scenario
score. The trees start with a decision node, with the four alternatives of scenarios
branching from it. Each scenario has branches presenting the criteria, and each criteria
branches into the sub-criteria. The branches have the weights, and the rankings are
assigned at the end of the tree branches.
The reports module then develops the risk profile graphs as it shows the risks
and opportunities of choosing one scenario over the other. The first graph is the
probability chart, which shows the effect of changing the weights of the criteria and
sub-criteria on the scenario scores, reflecting the probability of choosing a certain
scenario over the other. The second graph is the cumulative graph, which presents the
ranges of values that the scenario can yield versus the corresponding probabilities or
weights. A statistical summary report is then formulated to provide some statistics about
all the ranges of possible outcomes of the decision tree.
The following reports are called the policy suggestion reports, which help the
decision maker look at the broader picture when making his decision. The decision table
report provides the “benefit of correct choice,” which is basically the difference
between the value of the highest scenario score and the lowest one. This helps in
showing whether the scenario scores are close or not. The policy suggestion reports
also include an optimal tree report that shows the path of the optimal decision only.

4 . 2 . 8 The Sensitivity Analysis Module
Figure 15 shows the relationship between the sensitivity analysis module and
the framework modules. The sensitivity analysis module inputs come from the
scenarios selection module, and it presents its outputs to the user-interface module
directly. The sensitivity analysis is another form of the risk profile graphs of the reports
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module. It shows the effect of changing certain inputs on the final output of the module.
The sensitivity analysis is performed to study the effect of changing the criteria rankings
on the scenario scores.

Scenarios
Selection
Module

Sensitivity
Analysis
Module

UserInterface
Module

Figure 15: The Sensitivity Analysis Module Interrelation with the Other
Modules

As stated above, the inputs of the sensitivity analysis module are the ranks
presented in the scenarios selection module. The criteria rankings can be any integer
number between one and five. The sensitivity analysis is done by changing the value of
the rankings of the sub-criteria from one to five, and the output is observed. This is
done for the sub-criteria that have the highest rankings; moreover, it is performed
individually for each sub-criteria, then a double-sensitivity analysis is executed to
measure the effect of changing two sub-criteria at the same time. A strategy graph is
also provided to measure the sensitivity of changing the rankings of a sub-criteria on
all the alternatives or the scenarios to determine the area of decision within the desired
output. A tornado graph and a spider graph are used to present the results of the
sensitivity analysis.
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CHAPTER 5 : RESULTS ANALYSIS, VERIFICATION
AND VALIDATION
5 . 1 The Waste Water Treatment Plant (Case Study)
In this research, a case study of a wastewater treatment plant in Egypt is applied
to the prototype model in order to validate the proposed framework. The case study of
concern is a design, build, finance, operate, maintain, renew, and transfer of ownership
PPP contract (DBFOMRT). It has many forms of PPP agreements, which makes it very
suitable to be used as a validation for the suggested framework.
The concession period is set to be 20 years, divided into two years of
construction and 18 years of operation. The plant is to produce 250,000 cubic meters of
treated domestic wastewater per day as per the required specifications in the contract.
The Service Provider is to receive periodic availability payments in exchange for the
sewage treatment, which is the payment mechanism of this PPP contract. The location
of the wastewater treatment plant, the SPV name, the consultants’ and advisors’ names
are concealed due to confidentiality. The Owner or the Grantor of the wastewater
treatment plant is the Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Development
(MHUUD), while the tender documents were issued by the New Urban Communities
Authority (NUCA) with the assistance of the PPP Central Unit of the Ministry of
Finance.
In Egypt, the PPP Central Unit is part of the Ministry of Finance and deals with
all PPP projects in Egypt. The goal of the unit is to assist the different ministries during
the tender process and along the lifecycle of the PPP projects in order to promote the
PPP initiative in Egypt. The unit is also engaged in developing PPP project proposals,
forming the financial and legal documents of the projects, announcing new PPP projects
to the private sector, reviewing the bids, and providing feedbacks and solutions to any
obstacles facing the PPP projects. In other words, the PPP Central Unit is the unit
forming the standard practice for the PPP projects.
The pre-qualification documents of the project were issued in December 2007,
and five bidders were qualified for the bid. The final tender documents were issued in
February 2009. The tender was based on a competitive bidding process including a
technical bid and a financial bid. The project is tendered under Law no. 89 for 1998,
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which is the Law on Organizing Tenders and Bids for Public Procurement and its
Executive Regulations, issued by virtue of Decree no. 1367 for 1998 by the Ministry of
Finance. The contract was issued in June 2009, before the PPP law was issued. In
August 2010, the People’s Assembly of Egypt approved Law no. 67 for Partnerships
with the Private Sector in Infrastructure Projects and Public Utilities. The Executive
Regulations of the law were issued through Prime Ministerial Decree no. 238 for the
year 2011.
One of the Conditions Precedent for the Contract to come into effect is to submit
a financial model that has all the calculations and computations of the financial bid. The
components of the financial model is explained in detail in Chapter Three of this
research. Typically, the financial model should include detailed calculations of all the
costs, including direct and indirect costs and contingencies, and the revenues of the PPP
project. The outputs of the model usually includes the different financial statements and
the financial indicators.
The Independent Financial Expert is a third party that reviews the base financial
model and prepares any amendments based on that model when an event arises that
harms the Return on Equity value as per Contract Clause 34.4: Mechanisms of
Compensation for Contract Re-equilibrium. This Clause states that the method of
calculating the re-equilibrium value shall be to keep the internal rate of return of the
Service Provider, or the SPV constant. Then, the re-equilibrium scenarios are defined
in Contract Clause 34.5: Forms of Compensation, including adjusting the PPP payment,
paying a lump sum amount, or a combination of the above.
In the wastewater treatment plant contract, it is stated that the Independent
Financial Expert is the one to determine the form of compensation; however, in case of
dispute, the issue shall be referred to the Partnership Committee. According to Contract
Clause 24, the Partnership Committee consists of five representatives who belong to
the New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA), the Construction Authority for
Portable Water and Wastewater, the Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban
Development (MHUUD), the PPP Central Unit, and the Egyptian Water, Wastewater
Regulatory, and Customer Protection Authority (EWRA), as well as another five
representatives belonging to the Service Provider (SPV.) The Partnership Committee is
not a third party, as it consists of both involved parties, which seems not to be the best
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way to deal with disputes. The PPP contract renegotiation process needs to be supported
and enhanced in order to avoid disputes. To achieve this, the suggested framework
provides guidance through the PPP contract renegotiation process by defining the exact
events leading to the renegotiation of the PPP contract and the party responsible for
each event. The framework also helps in formulating the re-equilibrium scenarios;
moreover, it defines the optimal scenario to suit all parties. The framework results are
unbiased and robust, therefore enhancing transparency and mutual trust between the
parties.

5 . 2 Results Analysis
In this case study, a call for a contract re-equilibrium was raised by the Service
Provider in April 2013 due to a delay in the operation start date. The public sector,
represented by the New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA), was responsible for
the delay in delivering the influent water, which was the wastewater to be treated by
the plant. Moreover, NUCA was also delayed in providing the effluent pumping station.
The above case was presented to the Independent Financial Expert (IFA) of the project.
The same case will be applied to Decision Support System model in order to validate
the suggested model and compare the results obtained with the outputs of the IFA.

5 . 2 . 1 The User-Interface Module
The user-interface module interacts with the user dynamically along the
different stages of the Decision Support System model, as it is linked to almost all of
the other modules. It provides the inputs for some modules while receiving the output
from the others to present them to the user. The welcome screen of the model consists
of the model name “PPP Contract Renegotiation DSS” and its version, as shown in
Figure 16. By clicking into anywhere in the screen, the user is directed to the second
user-interface page, shown in Figure 17, to start inputting the data that will be used in
the following modules.
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Figure 16: DSS User-interface no.1

Figure 17: DSS User-interface no.2
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The first set of data required are the project name, the PPP contract type, the
risk matrix used, the payment mechanism, the payment amount, and the payment
intervals. The project name of the case study is the wastewater treatment plant; the
actual name is concealed due to confidentiality. The contract type is a design, build,
finance, operate, maintain, renew, and transfer of ownership PPP contract
(DBFOMRT). The payment mechanism is availability payments in which service
availability is the key condition for the payment. The service availability definition in
the case study contract is to be able to deliver quarter of a million cubic meters of treated
wastewater per day. The payment value is 32 million Egyptian Pounds (EGP) to be paid
quarterly by the government to the private sector. As for the “risk matrix used” field,
the user selects from a dropdown menu whether to use a default risk matrix or input a
risk matrix as per the contract of the wastewater treatment plant, as shown in Figure 18.
When the “user input” option is selected, a hyperlink appears on the right, marked with

no. 1

Figure 18: DSS User-Interface no.2'

74

arrow no.1, which directs the user to the risk allocation module in order to input some
information with regard to the risks profile of the project, including all possible risks,
their allocations, and their expected impact on the project valuation process. However,
the default risk matrix is selected for the purpose of this case study, which is deduced
from the literature review. The rest of the user-interface module shall be explained
along with the following modules, for the model is to be explained in the right sequence.

5 . 2 . 2 The Risk Allocation Module
The risk allocation process in general is very important through the lifecycle of
any PPP project, especially during the renegotiation of the PPP contract. Risk
allocations and their impacts on Equation 3 are used in the different calculations in the
model. They affect the valuation process of the PPP project, and at the same time, they
are important for determining which risks should be accounted for when calculating the
re-equilibrium value.
The user input risk table and the default risk table have the same formatting with
respect to the table columns and their headings. However, the default risk table has
already been filled with data extracted from the literature review to be ready for use in
case of quick access to the other modules in the model. On the other hand, the user input
risk table is to be filled with the exact percentages of allocations as per the contract.
The user input risk matrix is more accurate and recommended to be used when possible.
Figure 19 shows the default risk table used in the Decision Support System prototype
model. As shown in the figure, the first column contains a set of standardized risks, and
the following column contains their typical allocations to the public sector, the private
sector, or shared among them. The following three columns show the exact percentages
of the risks allocations carried by the different parties or shared. This portion of the
table is extracted from the literature review (Badran, 2013). The risks are then divided
into three main risk categories: country-related risks, sector-related risks, and projectrelated risks. An example of a country risk is macroeconomic risk, while an example of
sector risk is market risk. The project risks are risks related to the nature of the project
itself, such as permits risk.
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Figure 19: Risks Default Table
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The column headings in the right half of the table start with “Impact.” This part
of the risk table identifies which terms of the PPP valuation equation are affected when
a risk materializes. This is important in order to study which part of the equation is
going to be adjusted when calculating the re-equilibrium value of the contract if
renegotiation is required, as will be shown later. Finally, for the purpose of the case
study, the default risk table is used in the model as the exact allocation percentages are
concealed due to confidentiality.

5 . 2 . 3 The PPP Valuation Module
After preparing the risk table, the user is referred to the third screen of userinterface module by clicking the button at the bottom of Figure 19. The following screen
is shown in Figure 20. This screen is for inputting the project payment information. In

Figure 20: DSS User-interface no.3
other words, it summarizes the financial model submitted to the government, which is
part of the wastewater treatment plant contract. It has all the base values for the cash in
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and cash out of the project. As shown in the figure, the wastewater treatment plant
milestones are inputted by the user, including the project start date, the project end date,
the construction period, and the concession period. The user is also asked to enter the
re-equilibrium date, which is the effective date or a benchmark from which the reequilibrium scenario is calculated. For instance, if the increase in the availability
payment scenario is chosen, the adjusted availability payment is assumed to be paid
starting from the re-equilibrium date until the end date of the project. The interest rate
is the rate at which the cash flows are to be discounted to obtain the concession value
at the project start date. The producer price index (PPI) is used to adjust the cash flows
to account for the effect of inflation, and it is fixed to equal 108 percent as per the case
study contract.
The user then clicks the “Input Payment Distribution” to the right of Figure 20
in order to move on to the cash flow table and enter the values for the payment
distribution as stated in the base financial model and the concession contract. The table
used for the entry of the initial payments in and out cash flows is shown in Figure 21.
The first column contains the equation parameters in order to insert the cash flows
corresponding to each category. The header of the second column is set to the project
start and continues by adding one month to each column until reaching the project end
date. The table in Figure 21 is trimmed for illustration purposes.
As stated before, this table is the summary of the base financial model in the
concession contract. The complete schedule of payments is included in Appendix A.
The first item in the table is the capital fund which is the investment costs paid by the
private sector. The investment cost has two sources: debt and equity. In this case study,
the equity constitutes 30 percent of the total investment cost, while the debt constitutes
70 percent. The investment cost is paid during the construction period over the first two
years of the concession period, as per the financial model. The schedule of payments
from January 2010 until December 2011 is included in Appendix A. The investment
cost includes the engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contract value of
the wastewater treatment plant, which is a subcontract. It also includes the contingency,
the advisors’ fees, the bid bond commission, the performance bond commission,
general and administrative charges during the construction period, and any other preoperation expense.
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Figure 21: Initial Payment Distribution

Figure 22: Risk Factor Filtration
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The second line in the table is the loan payments, which shows the profile of the
debt portion of the capital expenditure. It is paid on a quarterly basis for the same period
of the capital expenditure from January 2010 until December 2011.
The third item is the operation income, which includes the availability payment
paid by the public sector during the operation period from January 2012 until December
2029. The operation income includes capacity charges, fixed operation charges,
variable operation charges, sludge revenues, and interest income on the debt service
reserve account (DSRA).
The fourth item is the government subsidy, which in this case study is the
electricity charges. The following items are the loan principle payments and the loan
interest payments. The loan terms in this project are 15 years with a two-year grace
period. The operation expenses include the operation and maintenance costs of the
wastewater treatment and the sludge treatment. They also include the general and
administrative charges during the operation period.
The last two rows of the table are the taxes and the quantity of output produced,
which is, in this case study, the amount of treated wastewater in cubic meters. Finally,
the user is referred back to the user interface sheets by clicking on the button at the
bottom of Figure 21.

5 . 2 . 4 The Financial Model Re-equilibrium Module
After inputting the initial payment information, the user is directed to the
following screen of the user-interface module in order to enter the events that led to the
contract renegotiation. Figure 23 shows the following user-interface screen. In this
screen, the user is asked to enter the reasons for re-equilibrium. The user is also asked
to select the corresponding risk factor to which the event belongs.
In the wastewater treatment plant case study, the events that led to renegotiation
of the contract were delays in the operation start date, a delay by the New Urban
Communities Authority (NUCA) to deliver the influent water (the wastewater to be
treated by the plant), and a delay by NUCA to provide the effluent pumping station. All
the above risks belong to the risk category of connection of public utilities to site
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boundaries. The user may prefer to enter three events all at the same time or separately,
yet the model shall give the same results in all cases.
In the background, those risk categories are filtered to consider the share of risk
belonging to the public sector only. The filtration process is shown in Figure 22, where
the model recalls the exact percentages of allocations belonging to a certain risk

Figure 23: DSS User-interface no.4

category and which part of the equation will be impacted. This part is not shown to the
user, as the user will be directed to the following user-interface screen shown in Figure
24. The message at the beginning of the screen is a variable, which changes to inform
the user of the events that will be considered in the renegotiation process. The user is
asked to re-enter the same information that is required in the PPP valuation module, but
after reflecting the impacts of those filtered events on the payments values. The user is
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directed to a screen similar to the previous module shown in Figure 25 to enter the
updated distribution of the payments cash flows.
The detailed cash flow is shown in Appendix A. One of the major changes
between the base cash flow and the updated cash flow is the missing operation income,
missing government subsidy, and missing output in the period from January 2012 until
March 2013, as the new operation start date is April 1, 2013. All cash flows are
discounted up to January 2010, which is considered the benchmark or time zero.

Figure 24: DSS User-interface no.5
The discount rate (i) used is entered by the user in the screen shown in Figure
20. Figure 26 shows a summary of the present values of the payment distribution items
for both the initial values and the updated ones. Using Equation 3, the value of the
concession at time zero for the base value is almost 37 million Egyptian Pounds, while
the updated value is almost negative 161 million Egyptian Pounds. The difference
between the two values is considered to be the re-equilibrium value at time zero, which
is almost 198 million Egyptian Pounds.
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Figure 25: Updated Payment Distribution

Figure 26: PPP Concession Value and Re-equilibrium Value at t = 0
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5 . 2 . 5 The Scenarios Development Module
As stated in previous sections, the common three scenarios used to regain the
financial model equilibrium are paying a lump sum amount to the private sector,
increasing the service charges, or increasing the concession period. The re-equilibrium
value calculated in the previous module is to be used as the basis for calculating the
values of the above three scenarios as well as an additional fourth scenario, which is a
combination of any two of the above scenarios. All the calculations are done in the
background, as the user will only get to see the final results of the scenarios. Figure 27
shows the scenarios development tables.

Figure 27: Re-equilibrium Scenarios Calculations

The first scenario is paying a lump sum amount to the private sector. The value
of the lump sum payment is assumed to be paid at the re-equilibrium date, which is
April 2013. Hence, the lump sum payment is calculated using Equation 4 where (i) is
the discount rate ten percent, (N) is the number of periods from time zero (January
2010) until the re-equilibrium date (April 2013), (PV) is the re-equilibrium payment at
time = 0, and finally the (FV) calculated is the lump sum value to be paid by the public
sector to the private sector, which is almost 270 million Egyptian Pounds.
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The second re-equilibrium scenario is adjusting the availability payment paid to
the private sector. The model shall automatically select the payment mechanism used
in the contract and calculate the additional payment required to reach re-equilibrium.
The case study payment mechanism is availability payments, where the payment value
is almost 32 million Egyptian Pounds paid quarterly to the private sector.
The amount of the added payment is calculated via Equation 5 where the (A) is
the adjusted amount, (PV) is the lump sum payment at the re-equilibrium date obtained
in the first scenario, (i) in this case is the fixed discount rate of 10 percent divided by
the number of periods in one year, which is four, in order to get the effective discount
rate, and (N) is the number of periods from the re-equilibrium date until the end date of
the project, which is four multiple of the difference in years between April 2013 and
December 2029.
The adjusted amount is then added to the original payment amount as shown in
the scenario two calculations of Figure 27. Finally, the adjusted payment is almost 40
million Egyptian Pounds, paid quarterly starting from the re-equilibrium date until the
end of the concession period.
Moreover, the third option to return the contract equilibrium is adjusting the
concession period. This is calculated by first by using Equation 4 to get the future value
of the re-equilibrium value at the end of the project in December 2029. (FV) in this case
is the required payment at the end date of the project, (PV) is the difference between
the present value of the PPP concession value and the PPP updated concession value at
the start date of the project, or simply the re-equilibrium value, (i) is the fixed discount
rate of 10 percent, and (N) is the number of years of the concession period, 20 years.
This value is to be considered the present value in Equation 5. The (A) is the 32
million Egyptian Pounds; the (i) is the effective discount rate per quarter. The equation
is solved to get (N), which constitutes the number of periods remaining to be able to
regain the financial model re-equilibrium. The maximum concession period for PPP
contracts in Egypt is 30 years, as regulated by the Egyptian Law of PPP. However, in
this case study, after adding the (N) obtained to the original concession period, the
adjusted concession period exceeded 30 years, violating the law and making scenario
three inapplicable.
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All the previous calculations are done in the background, as after the user enters
the updated payment distribution in Figure 24, the user will be directed straight to the
preliminary three re-equilibrium scenarios in Figure 29. The user will then be directed
to Figure 28 in order to enter the elements of the fourth scenario. The user chooses a
combination from the above three scenarios in order to calculate their values. In the
case study, the Independent Financial Expert chose the fourth scenario to be a
combination of adjusting the quarterly payments and extending the concession period.
The user is also asked to enter a limitation to one of the two items selected. In this case
study, the concession period is to be set to the maximum which is 30 years, as per
Egyptian Law.

Figure 28: DSS User-interface no.6

The calculations of the fourth scenario are shown in Figure 27. The first row is
the limitation which is what the user defines in the user-interface screen. The limitation
shall always be a figure greater than the contractual value. Without entering a limitation,
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there would be an infinite number of combinations for scenario four. The second row
is the remaining value which is the difference between the limitation and the base value.
In other words, it is the value that shall be transferred into the other form of the
combination.
In the case study, the combination chosen for the fourth scenario is to adjust the
concession period and the capacity charge. The limitation for the concession period has
been set to 30 years. The remaining value is 10 years. An adjusted quarterly payment
is to be paid starting from the re-equilibrium date until the end of the 30-year adjusted
concession period. In order to calculate the amount to be added to the base quarterly
payment, the following steps should be followed.
A new re-equilibrium payment should be calculated to deduct the value of the
payments to be paid in the additional 10 years of the concession period. This is done
using Equation 5 where the (A) is the 32 million Egyptian Pounds payments paid in the
additional 10 years, (i) in this case is 10 percent fixed discount rate divided by four
periods in order to get the effective discount rate, and (N) is the number of periods in
the additional 10 years, which is 40, as the payments are paid quarterly. The (PV)
obtained is discounted until the project start date.
The (PV) is to be plugged into Equation 4 as the future value, (i) is the fixed
discount rate of 10 percent, and (N) is 20. The (PV) obtained from Equation 4 shall be
deducted from the re-equilibrium value at time zero to obtain the new re-equilibrium
value, which shall be plugged into Equation 4 to obtain the (FV) at the re-equilibrium
date, then Equation 5 shall be used to obtain (A), which is the adjustment that shall be
added to the base capacity charge of the project. The adjusted payment in this case is
almost 35 million Egyptian Pounds. The final set of scenarios are presented to the user,
as shown in Figure 30.
Finally, the four re-equilibrium scenarios, obtained from the model, are very
close to the ones obtained by the Independent Financial Expert. One of the scenario’s
value is almost identical to the IFE value, and the others do not exceed the IFC values
by more than five percent. This is considered an acceptable range to validate the
developed model.
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Figure 29: The Preliminary Re-equilibrium Scenarios

Figure 30: The Final Re-equilibrium Scenarios
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5 . 2 . 6 The Scenarios Selection Module
The purpose of the scenarios selection module is to be able to identify the best
scenario from the four re-equilibrium scenarios: paying a lump sum amount to the
private sector, increasing the service charge, adjusting the concession period, and a
fourth scenario with a combination of any two of the above scenarios. The aim is to
maximize the satisfaction of both parties. In order to achieve this goal, a set of criteria
should be defined in order to evaluate this degree of satisfaction.
After the user is directed to the final set of scenarios developed in the previous
module, shown in Figure 30, the user shall click the button at the bottom to enter the
re-equilibrium criteria. The user-interface module presents the screen in Figure 31 for
the user to enter the criteria in the first row of the table. The user may also enter subcriteria for each one of the criteria. The criteria main categories are economic, political,
financial, project related, contractual, and policy. The economic criteria has to do with
the economic situation of the country where the project is located. The sub-criteria for
this category include inflation, general conditions of the country, stability of the
exchange rates, and how the IRR is affected by all of the above. This is followed by the
political criteria. The sub-criteria include long-term stability of the country, the current
political situation, and the justice system in general. In addition, the financial criteria
has to do with the party’s financial standing. It includes any current financial
obligations required to be paid by the party, additional financial obligations, liquidity,
the ratio between debt and equity, and the transparency of financial data. On the other
hand, the project-related criteria is specific to the project nature, which includes original
concession period, preferable concession period, and the level of complexity of the
project. Moreover, the contractual criteria includes existence of regulator, risk sharing
agreement, and how clear the termination clauses and re-equilibrium clauses are.
Finally, the policy criteria is the general manner in which a certain party usually reacts
to a certain situation. It includes the long-term business strategy, the likelihood of
repeated business with a certain partner who is able to recognize the claim, and the
experience of other partners. After the user enters the re-equilibrium criteria, the user
shall enter scenario one priorities by clicking on the button in Figure 31. The user is
then directed to the screen in Figure 32.
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Figure 32: Re-equilibrium Criteria

Figure 31: Criteria and Sub-criteria Priorities
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The weights of each criteria and sub-criteria changes depending on its relation
to a certain scenario, as explained in the methodology; hence, the user shall be directed
to four screens, each one representing the weights for a specific scenario. The detailed
priority tables are in Appendix A; however, Figure 32 shows a sample of the priorities
of the criteria and the economic sub-criteria for scenario one. The user is asked to select
from a dropdown menu which is more important among combinations of two criteria
with respect to the selected scenario. The user has the right to select both criteria if he
believes that they are equally important. In the background of the model, this
information shall be transferred to form the decision matrix shown in Figure 33. The
decision matrix is a mirror matrix with the top row identical to the first column, then
the priorities are entered in the respective cells. The weights of the criteria or the subcriteria are calculated in the tables, shown also in Figure 33, by counting the number of
occurrences of the criteria or the sub-criteria in the decision matrix and dividing it by
the total number of occurrences of all the criteria or the sub-criteria to get a percentage.
The weights for the economic, political, financial, project-related, contractual and
policy with respect to scenario one are shown in Figure 33.
After the user selects all the priorities for the four scenarios, the weights are
ready to be used in the weighted sum model. As stated before, there exist separate
weights for the criteria and the sub-criteria for each one of the four scenarios. However,
the user is to enter only one rank for all the four. The user will be directed to the screen
where he enters a ranking for the sub-criteria. A sample of the ranking sheet is shown
in Figure 34. There exist two separate sheets for the private sector and the public sector.
The sheet structure is shown in Figure 34, where the first column is the sub-criteria. In
order to decide whether this sub-criteria is in favor of the party or not, the user looks at
the risk allocations in order to see the broader picture. The following column is related
risk, where the user chooses the risk that affects his decision from a dropdown menu.
The risk allocation will automatically appear for the user to choose the suitable rank for
a certain sub-criteria. The ranks are very suitable, suitable, neutral, unsuitable, and very
unsuitable. The user selects the ranks from a dropdown menu. For the purpose of this
case study, the weights and ranks are advised by governmental officials and private
sector representatives.
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Figure 33: Criteria and Sub-criteria Decision Matrix
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Figure 34: Sub-criteria Ranking
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After both the private sector and the public sector enter the ranks, twelve
scenario scores are calculated: four from the public sector perspective, four from the
private sector perspective, and four from the perspective of both. Using the weighted
sum model presented in Equation 6, where (x) is the number of alternatives scenarios,
which is twelve scenarios, (i) is the number of main criteria, which is six, (j) is the
number of sub-criteria of a certain main criteria, which varies depending on the criteria,
(W) is the weights, and (R) is the rankings. Figure 35 shows the calculations of the

Figure 35: Scenario Scores Calculations

scenario scores in the bottom. The last column to the right, called the combined ranks,
is the average of the private sector ranks and the public sector ranks. The scenarios with
the highest scores are identified as the best scenarios for each party and the combined
best scenario for both the public and the private sectors. After entering the ranks, the
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user is directed to the results directly without going into the calculation details. The
results are presented via the user-interface screen shown in Figure 36.

Figure 36: DSS User-interface no.7

5 . 2 . 7 The Reports Module
By clicking on the link at the bottom of Figure 36, the user will be directed to
the reports module. The reports module includes all the outputs of the previous
modules. The PPP concession value and the re-equilibrium value is also reported in this
section; moreover, this section also includes the re-equilibrium scenarios reports and
the best scenarios reports. The reports module also includes the risk allocation charts.
The charts are located in Appendix A, yet a sample of the charts is shown in Figure 37.
Risk allocation charts give a sense of which party is bearing the highest share of the
risks.
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Figure 37: Default Risk Allocation Chart

The following set of reports is developed using Precision Tree 5.5 for Excel
add-in. The following report is the decision tree showing the process of selecting the
best scenario and calculating the expected monetary value (EMV). Three trees are
formulated: one for the private sector best scenario, one for the public sector best
scenario, and one for the best scenario considering both of them. The three charts are
included in Appendix A. Three more charts are drawn to show only the optimal paths
of the three trees, a sample of which is shown below in Figure 38. It belongs to the
private sector decision tree. As shown previously, the second scenario is the scenario
with the highest score, which means it is the preferable scenario for the private sector.
Figure 38 shows the calculations of scenario two scores, where the first decision node
represents the criteria of selection and the weights are shown at the arrows. The
following decision nodes represent the sub-criteria, where the arrows have both their
weights and the ranks, as well.
The following set of reports are the risk profile graphs, which consist of a
probability chart, a cumulative graph, and a statistical summary. The purpose of these
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Figure 38: Private Sector Optimal Decision Tree
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graphs is to show the risks and probability of selecting one scenario versus the other.
The reports are included in Appendix A. A sample of the reports belonging to the
private sector is shown below. Figure 39 demonstrates the first type of risk profile
graph, the probability chart. The chart shows the different values for the four scenario
scores and their probability of occurrence. For example, the probability that the scenario
one score equals four is 46 percent, and the probability that the scenario three score
equals three is 19 percent.
On the other hand, Figure 40 demonstrates the cumulative probability chart, in
which the chart demonstrates the probability of a scenario score equal or less than a
certain value. For instance, the probability that the scenario two score is less than or
equal to three is 30 percent, while the probability that the scenario four score is less
than or equal to one is 13 percent.
Figure 41 displays a statistical summary of the risk profile, which includes
statistical information such as the mean, the standard deviation, the minimum and
maximum values, the mode, the skewness, and the kurtosis. As shown in the figure, the
expected value or the mean for scenario one is 3.54, for scenario two is 3.81, for
scenario three is 3.43, and for scenario four is 3.52. From the expected value point of
view only, scenario two is the optimum scenario to be selected by the private sector.
Figure 42 displays another type of reports called the policy suggestion reports.
Those reports help the management see the broader picture, not only the scenario with
the highest score. The decision trees and the optimal decision tree in Figure 38 are
considered part of this section of reports. Figure 42 shows optimal decision selected at
each decision node and what is called “benefit of the correct choice.” Since the model
has only one decision node, which is selecting the best scenario, the table has only one
decision node, and its probability of occurrence is 100 percent. The benefit of the
correct choice is the difference between the highest scenario score and the lowest
scenario score. In the case of the private sector, the highest scenario score is a scenario
two score which equals 3.81, and the lowest scenario score is scenario three which
equals 3.43. The difference between the two scenarios is 0.38, which is the benefit of
the correct choice in Figure 42. This helps the management get a sense of the whole
spectrum when making their decision.
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Figure 39: Private Sector Probability Chart
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Figure 40: Private Sector Cumulative Chart
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Figure 41: Private Sector Statistical Summary

Figure 42: Private Sector Policy Suggestion
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5 . 2 . 8 The Sensitivity Analysis Module
The sensitivity analysis module is the final module in the Decision Support
System. The sensitivity analysis is applied to the ranks of the sub-criteria. As the ranks
change from very suitable, which is denoted by the number five, to very unsuitable,
which is denoted by the number one, the scenario scores are affected. Hence, it is
important to observe how sensitive the scenario scores are to the change in the rank of
a certain sub-criteria. The sub-criteria with the highest ranks are chosen for the
sensitivity analysis; moreover, double sensitivity analysis is also performed to study the
effect of changing two sub-criteria ranks at the same time. The sensitivity analysis
reports are included in Appendix A. A sample of the sensitivity analysis reports is
presented below.
The sensitivity graph in Figure 43 shows the relationship between changing the
ranking of the “exchange rates” sub-criteria and the expected monetary value (EMV)
of the tree. The table on the right shows that if the ranking decreased by 80 percent, the
EMV would decrease by almost six percent. In addition, if the ranking decreased by 20
percent, the EMV would decrease by almost one percent. The difference between the

Figure 43: 'Exchange Rate' Sub-criteria Rank Sensitivity Graph
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highest EMV and the lowest EMV is 0.21, more than half the “benefit of correct choice”
value, which denotes that the change of ranking of the “exchange rates” sub-criteria is
rather sensitive to the selection of the best scenario process.
Figure 44 is the second type of sensitivity report: the strategy region report. The
strategy region report shows how sensitive each scenario score is to the change in the
ranking of the “exchange rate” sub-criteria. The figure shows that for every possible
value of the ranking of the “exchange rate” sub-criteria, scenario two shall always have
the highest EMV. In other words, the result is not sensitive at all to the value of this
variable. However, each scenario score is affected differently by the change of the
ranking of this factor. For instance, the scenario four score is more sensitive to changing
the ranking than the scenario one score, as the line is steeper.

Figure 44: 'Exchange Rate' Sub-criteria Rank Strategy Region
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Figure 45 shows the three sub-criteria: “long-term stability,” “exchange rates,”
and “inflation.” The graph shows the EMV corresponding to each sub-criteria when its
ranking varies from one to five. The first bar on the top is the “long term stability” subcriteria. This bar is noticed to be the longest bar among the three, which shows that the
EMV is more sensitive to the change of the ranking than the other sub-criteria.

Figure 45: Private Sector Tornado Graph

The spider graph shown in Figure 46 confirms the same conclusion, as the line
of the “long-term stability” sub-criteria is steeper than the other two lines, followed by
the line of the “exchange rates” sub-criteria and in the end the line of the “inflation”
sub-criteria. This concludes that the “long-term stability” is highly affected by the
change in the ranks followed by the “exchange rates” sub-criteria and the “inflation”
sub-criteria.
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Figure 46: Private Sector Spider Graph

A two way sensitivity analysis is also performed to study the effect of changing
the ranking of two sub-criteria at the same time on the expected monetary value of the
decision tree or the preferred scenario. The two sub-criteria with the highest weights
are selected, which are the “justice system” and the “long-term stability.” Figure 47
shows the sensitivity graph for both sub-criteria with respect to the private sector EMV.
The x-axis denotes the ranking of the “long-term stability” sub-criteria, the y-axis
denotes the “justice system” sub-criteria, and finally, the z-axis denotes the EMV of the
model. As shown in the figure and the attached table, as the rankings of the “justice
system” sub-criteria and the “long-term stability” sub-criteria increase, the EMV
increases, as well.

105

Figure 47: Two Way Sensitivity Graph
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Another type of two way sensitivity analysis is the strategy region. Figure 48
shows the strategy region of the “justice system” sub-criteria and the “long term
stability” sub-criteria for the private sector decision tree. The strategy region graph aims
is to provide the user with every possible outcome for every combination of the subcriteria rankings.

Figure 48: Two Way Sensitivity Analysis Strategy Region
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For any combination of the rankings of the two sub-criteria, two possible
preferred scenarios exist: either scenario one or scenario two. The probability of
obtaining scenario one is higher than scenario two, as there exist a larger number of
combinations resulting in scenario one than the number of combinations resulting in
scenario two. It is also noticed from the graph that when the ranking of “justice system”
sub-criteria approaches the maximum value and the ranking of the “long-term stability”
sub-criteria approaches the minimum, scenario two becomes the optimum scenario, and
vice versa.

5 . 3 The Prototype Model Verification and Validation
The verification of the model involves verifying the methods and techniques
used in the Decision Support System prototype model; moreover, it includes verifying
the outputs or the results obtained from the model. Calculations of the four scenarios,
the weights of the criteria and sub-criteria, and the scenario scores were manually
checked to avoid any numerical errors. Error messages were designed whenever
possible to guide the users and avoid incorrect entries. An example of an error message
is shown in Figure 49 where if the user enters risk allocation percentages to the public
sector, the private sector, and shared that do not add up to 100 percent, the user is
warned via an error message to adjust the allocations to avoid incorrect entry.

Figure 49: Risk Allocation Percentage Error Message
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In addition, sensitivity analysis is one of the tools that was used to verify the
Decision Support System prototype model. The sub-criteria with the highest ranks were
used in order to monitor their effects on the expected monetary value (EMV) or the
preferred scenario score. The sensitivity analysis provided the possible outcomes of the
Decision Support System prototype model in uncertain conditions by providing all the
possible ranks and testing the output (EMV) for each of the ranks. One way and two
way sensitivity analyses were performed to measure the effect of changing the ranks of
separate sub-criteria and changing the ranks of two sub-criteria at the same time. The
sensitivity analysis module provided a variety of sensitivity charts and strategy region
reports. Finally, the results of the prototype model were verified.
After verifying the results of the Decision Support System prototype model, the
validity of the results is to be tested. One of the validation techniques is to compare the
results to a real-life case and observe the deviation or the variance between the
calculated results and the actual results obtained in real life.
The Decision Support System prototype model validation was conducted by
applying data from a real-life case of a contract renegotiation situation in Egypt. The
case study used was a wastewater treatment plant. Although the case study used is a
treatment plant, the model can be customized through the user-interface screens to work
with many other PPP projects. Moreover, the contract type of the case study is a design,
build, finance, operate, maintain, renew, and transfer of ownership PPP contract
(DBFOMRT), which combines many types of the typical PPP agreements. This
validates that the model can work with a variety of PPP contract types.
The wastewater treatment plant in the case study faced unfortunate events which
led to a delay in the operations start date. This was due to a delay by the New Urban
Communities Authority (NUCA) in delivering the influent water (the water that will be
treated) to the wastewater treatment plant, and a delay by NUCA to provide the effluent
pumping station, which pumps the output of the treatment plant to the government
network.
The impact of the above events, which belongs to the public sector, was
calculated in order to obtain the updated cash flow of the project. Then, the four reequilibrium scenarios — paying a lump sum amount to the private sector, increasing
the service charges, increasing the concession period, or a combination of any of the
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above — were calculated. Scenario three, which is increasing the concession period
was not applicable because it exceeded the 30-year maximum concession period
defined by the Egyptian Law of PPP. The four scenarios obtained from the model were
compared to the scenarios that were developed by the Independent Financial Expert in
real life. The results are shown in Table 5.
Table 5: Scenarios Percentage Variance
Scenarios
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
Scenario 4

Model Value
270.34
40.36
N/A
34.5
30

Units
M EGP
M EGP/Quarter
Years
M EGP/Quarter
Years

Percentage Variance
3.10%
0.40%
N/A
4.80%
-

In conclusion, the results obtained from the Decision Support System prototype
model were very close to the ones obtained from the Independent Financial Expert of
the Egyptian wastewater treatment plant. The percentage variance between the model
calculated scenarios and the IFE obtained scenarios varied from almost zero percent in
scenario two, which is adjusting the service charges, to a value not exceeding five
percent in the other two.
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CHAPTER 6 : CONCLUSION
6 . 1 Overview and Contributions
This research is concerned with the PPP contract re-equilibrium process, which
seems to be an inevitability due to the long concession periods of the PPP contracts.
The main objective of this research is to develop a tool that facilitates the lengthy and
costly renegotiation process. In order to achieve this, a Decision Support System
prototype tool has been developed with the aid of a number of computer programs,
including Microsoft Excel 2013, Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) programming
language, and the Precision Tree 5.5 for Excel add-in. These computer programs help
in making the model user-friendly. In addition, the model is a multi-user model, in
which both the public sector and the private sector are able to interact with its userinterface screens. The prototype model consists of eight modules: a user-interface
module, a risk allocation module, a PPP valuation module, a financial model reequilibrium module, a scenarios development module, a scenarios selection module, a
reports module, and a sensitivity analysis module.
The main contribution of this research is that it develops an interdisciplinary
framework that facilitates the PPP contract renegotiation process. The research tackled
different fields, such as construction, finance, and management. The methodological
framework is applied as a Decision Support System prototype model. The purpose of
the suggested framework is to enable all contract stakeholders to agree on a unified
method of developing the different re-equilibrium scenarios and choosing the optimal
scenario that suits all parties. This will facilitate the PPP renegotiation process, which
will, in turn, encourage investors to enter PPP projects. The developed framework is of
great benefit to project stakeholders, including the private sector, the public sector, and
the users of the service. It saves time and money invested in lengthy negotiations, and
it enforces transparency and mutual trust between the different parties by providing a
tool that tremendously minimizes conflicts during the renegotiation process and defines
clear steps to be followed in order to reach an agreement that will maximize the benefits
for both the private and the public sectors.
The verification of the model is done using three techniques. The first technique
is through manual calculations of the four re-equilibrium scenarios, the weights of the
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criteria and sub-criteria, and the scenario scores. The second technique is through error
messages that appear to the user to guide him through the input process and avoid
incorrect entries. The third technique is through the sensitivity analysis module, which
verifies the output for all the possible ranks of the sub-criteria with the highest weights.
On the other hand, the validation of the Decision Support System prototype model is
conducted by comparing the results of the model with the case study. The case study
used in the validation is a wastewater treatment plant in Egypt. The plant name is
concealed due to confidentiality. The project contract type is a design, build, finance,
operate, maintain, renew, and transfer of ownership PPP contract (DBFOMRT), which
enabled the model to cover many aspects of the PPP approach at once. The operation
start date of the plant was delayed due to a delay by the public sector to supply the
influent water to the wastewater treatment plant and to provide the effluent pumping
station. The impacts of those events were calculated and the base cash flow of the
project was updated. The four re-equilibrium scenarios were then calculated and
compared to the ones obtained by the Independent Financial Expert of the project. The
results of the comparison were shown in Table 5, and the percentages variance from the
real-life results were calculated. The comparison results are very close, relatively small
percentage errors, which validates the prototype model.
To sum up, the key features of the model are as follows. The Decision Support System
prototype model engages the private sector in the decision making process. Moreover,
the proposed framework enhances the transparency and the mutual trust. It saves time
and money invested in lengthy renegotiation process. In addition, a default risk matrix
is integrated in the risk allocation module, which allows a quick access to the following
modules. A filtration tool is also provided to only add the effects of the risks which are
allocated to the party of concern. The prototype model is validated by data obtained
from a case study of a wastewater treatment plant in Egypt.

6 . 2 Limitations
The model of the research has been tested on only one case study in Egypt due
to the limited number of PPP contracts executed in Egypt at the time of the research.
This was the wastewater treatment plant built in Egypt using PPP method during the
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production of this research. A larger number of case studies should be tested in order
to utilize and validate the model on a wider scale.
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APPENDIX A – PPP CONTRACT RENEGOTIATION
DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM
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Model Screenshot 2: Public Sector Risk Filtration Process
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Model Screenshot 3: User-Interface Screens
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Model Screenshot 4: Typical Risk Matrix
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Model Screenshot 5: Base Payment Distribution
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Model Screenshot 6: Base Payment Distribution (Cont.)

127

Model Screenshot 7: Base Payment Distribution (Cont.)
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Model Screenshot 8: Base Payment Distribution (Cont.)
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Model Screenshot 10: Updated Payment Distribution (Cont.)
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Model Screenshot 11: Updated Payment Distribution (Cont.)
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Model Screenshot 12: Updated Payment Distribution (Cont.)
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Model Screenshot 13: IRR Calculations for Base Values

133
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Model Screenshot 19: IRR Calculations for Updated Values (Cont.)
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Model Screenshot 27: Scenario One Decision Matrix
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